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A SURVEY OF STATE RETAIL INSTALMENT
SALES LEGISLATION
William E. Hogant
". people who are persuaded by persons whom they do not know to
enter into contracts that they do not understand to purchase goods that
they do not want with money that they have not got."
Anonymous judge referred to in Law and Progress,
Haldane Memorial Lecture 1944, Right Hon. Lord
Greene, Master of the Rolls.
I. INTRODUCTION
After a spurt of activity commencing in the thirties, comprehensive
legislation protecting the buyer under an instalment sale has received
steadily increasing attention in recent years.' In 1957 and 1958 such
statutes were enacted in eleven jurisdictions which previously had no
sales finance laws;2 extensive restraints now exist in twenty-eight states.3
It is, therefore, not surprising that there is considerable divergence both
as to the coverage, requirements, and enforcement of the existing state
legislation. The proposed Uniform Commercial Code suggests still
t See Contributors' Section, Masthead, p. 74, for biographical data.
I Indiana passed what appears to be the first such act in 1935. Four states followed
that lead prior to 1940: Wisconsin (1935), Massachusetts (1937), Maine (1939), and
Michigan (1939). Mors, "State Regulation of Retail Instalment Financing-Progress and
Problems," 23 J. Bus. U. Chi. 199 (1950).
2 Alaska Laws 1957, c. 120; 1 CCH Cond. Sale Chat. Mortg. Rep. 1567; Fla. Stat.
Ann. §§ 520.01-.13 (Supp. No. 6, 1957); Idaho Code Ann. §§ 64-806, 64-807 (Supp.
1957); Ill. Ann. Stat. c. 121 1/2, §§ 223-53 (Smith-Hurd, Supp. No. 3, 1957); Iowa
Code Ann. §§ 322.1-.17 (1946), and §§ 1-9 (Supp. No. 4, 1957); Kan. Laws 1958, H.B.
25-x; 1 CCH Cond. Sale Chat. Mortg. Rep. 6121; Minn. Laws 1957, c. 266; 1 CCH
Cond. Sale Chat. Mortg. Rep. 8171; Miss. Laws 1958, H.B. 25-x; 1 CCH Cond. Sale
Chat. Mortg. Rep. 8471; N.D. Laws 1957, H.B. No. 811; 2 CCH Cond. Sale Chat.
Mortg. Rep. 11, 481; Ore. Laws 1957, c. 625; 2 CCH Cond. Chat. Mortg. Rep. 12, 389;
S.D. Laws 1957, H.B. No. 891; 2 CCH Cond. Sale Chat. Mortg. Rep. 13, 675.
3 In addition to the jurisdictions cited supra note 2, Cal. Civ. Code Ann. §§ 2981-2
(West 1954); Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 13-16 (1 to 10) (1953); Conn. Gen. Stat. §§ 6698-
6704 (Supp. 1955) as amended by Acts 1957, P.A. 357 and 361; 1 CCH Cond. Sale Chat.
Mortg. Rep. 3059; Ind. Ann. Stat. §§ 58-901 to 945 (Supp. 1957); Ky. Rev. Stat. §§ 190.090-
.140 (Supp. 1957); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. c. 59, §§ 249-60 (Supp. 1957); Md. Ann. Code
art. 83, §§ 116-52 (Supp. 1957); Mass. Ann. Laws, c. 255, §§ 12-13F (Supp. 1956); Mich.
Comp. Laws §§ 492.101-.140 (Supp. 1956); Neb. Rev. Stat. § 60-617 (Supp. 1955) as
amended by Laws 1955, c. 110; 1 CCH Cond. Sale Chat. Mortg. Rep. 9358; Nev. Rev.
Stat. c. 97, §§ .010-.060 (1957); N.J. Stat. Ann. §§ 17:16B, 1-12 (Supp. 1956); N.Y. Pers.
Prop. Law §§ 301-11, §§ 401-18; Ohio Rev. Code Ann. §§ 1317.01-.12 (Page 1953); Pa.
Stat. Ann. tit. 69, §§ 601-37 (Supp. 1956); Utah Code Ann. § 15-1 to -2a (Supp. 1957);
Va. Code Ann. § 46-532 (Supp. 1956); Wis. Stat. Ann. §§ 218.01 (1)-(8) (Supp. 1957);
see also Hawaii Rev. Laws §§ 160-177 to -79 and §§ 160-82 (1955); and Hire-Purchase
Act 1938, 1 & 2 Geo. 6, c. 53 (England). One might argue about the inclusion of the
statutes of Alaska, Idaho, Nebraska, and Virginia under the label "extensive" since they
do not cover as broad an area as the other statutes. Inclusion of the first three may be
defended because of their recent modification or enactment. Virginia is added because
like Alaska it regulates the instalment sale in an unusual way through provisions in the
Motor Vehicle Code.
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other forms of control of such instalment sales, particularly by the
codification of the law of chattel security.4 Although the Code does not
often direct itself to consumer protection, it furnishes a sound and
intelligent basis for retail instalment legislation specifically directed to
that end.5
While these patterns of legal regulation have been emerging, the retail
instalment sales industry has experienced a gargantuan increase in its
volume of business. Instalment paper outstanding in 1925 has been
variously estimated at two to two and a half billion dollars.' Federal
Reserve Board statistics reveal that from the end of 1949 to the middle
of 1957, automobile and other consumer goods paper outstanding grew
from some eight billion to more than twenty-three billion dollars.7 If
we reach back to 1939, we find that the increase has been sevenfold,
from slightly more than three billion to more than twenty-three billion
dollars. Motor vehicle paper grew from slightly less than one and one-
half billion in 1939 to more than fifteen billion in 1957.1
The growth has not been merely quantitative. Qualitatively the sales
finance industry has experienced profound and rather far reaching
changes. As a result of the huge post-World War I growth in motor
vehicle sales, there has been developed a specialized group of com-
panies, designed originally at least to act in coordination with the "big
three" of the motor vehicle industry: General Motors Acceptance Cor-
poration (G.M.A.C.), formed as a subsidiary of the General Motors
Company; Commercial Investment Trust Corporation (C.I.T.), asso-
ciated with the Ford Motor Company; and Commercial Credit Com-
pany (C.C.C.), cooperating with Chrysler Corporation.' These firms
4 Article 9, Secured Transactions, codifies and compiles for the first time an integrated
set of rules governing transactions secured by an interest in personal property. Part five,
Default, is particularly helpful in formulating a reasoned amount of control over realiza-
tion of the security interest.
5 Article 9 establishes distinctions in this area based upon the kind of transaction rather
than upon the type of legal form involved. One of the categories so isolated is a
purchase-money security interest in consumer goods, U.C.C. 9-107 and 9-109 (1957 ed.).
The distinction is primarily of importance in connection with filing and proceedings on
default under § 9-302 and part five of the article.
6 Seligman, The Economics of Instalment Selling 18 (1927).
7 Fed. Reserve Bull. 1074 (Sept. 1957).
8 Ibid.
9 G.M.A.C. was incorporated in 1919, and its consolidated volume of retail financing
business has grown from approximately 73.6 million dollars in 1922 to 3.7 billion dol-
lars in 1956. Its total 1956 volume was 9.1 billion dollars. C.I.T., founded in 1924, does
retail, wholesale, and commercial factoring and had a 1956 total net purchase of 4.8 bil-
lion dollars. C.C.C., created in 1912, had a 1956 gross income of 161 million. Moody's
Bank and Financial Manual 1957, pp. 841, 845, 1132. The largely unsuccessful efforts
to disassociate these sales finance and manufacturing companies is traced in Birnbaum,
"The Auto-Finance Consent Decree: A New Technique in Enforcing the Sherman Act,"
24 Wash. U.L.Q. 525 (1939); Haberman and Birnbaum, "The Auto-Finance Consent
Decree, an Epilogue," 1950 Wash. U.L.Q. 46. In 1952 a consent decree entered against
General Motors was aimed at coercive practices forcing dealers to discriminate in favor
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have developed their astounding annual volumes primarily through
automotive financing."
But these are not the only competitors seeking to obtain a share of the
sales finance market; hundreds of small companies have entered the
scramble for the profits available from the public's growing acceptance
of instalment buying as a normal part of life." Among those who have
recognized the profit potential of sales financing are members of the
banking community who have instituted vigorous programs designed
to solicit such business.'" General references in this article to "sales
financing companies" or "sales financing agencies" include all of these
institutions which have developed as part of the expansion of instalment
sales financing.
As the volume of instalment sales has increased, many people
have grown more and more uneasy over the possibility that the
buyers involved in these sales are being duped by an avaricious segment
of the sales finance industry. There are also those who have regarded
the growth of instalment selling as offering an open invitation to dis-
honest debtors. Although it may be virtually impossible to approach this
or any other problem without some preconceptions as to the social values
involved, it would be well to identify and isolate some of them prior to
discussing the substantive provisions of statutes regulating instalment
buying.
Debtor-oriented people view the problem with thoughts of the eager
or careless buyer and the harassment, overreaching, and misrepresenta-
tion that mark some parts of the sales finance industry. This group
thinks of regulation as a necessary adjustment of the inequality of bar-
gaining power between the lending and borrowing class.'" To this the
creditor groups respond with recollections of dishonest debtors who mis-
of G.M.A.C., United States v. General Motors Corp., CCH Trade Reg. Rep. (1952 Trade
Cas.) fI 67,324 at 67,776 (N.D. Ill. 1952).
30 The expansion of instalment selling from its limited nineteenth century use in high
grade furniture houses can be traced from the introduction of the device into automobile
merchandising after the first World War, from which it spread to other lines during the
early twenties. Seligman, supra note 6, at 14-54; 12 Encyc. Brittanica 427 (1955).
It has been estimated that of the total credit extended in 1937 by 424 sales finance com-
panies these three firms handled over three-fourths of the auto loans through dealers and
one-half of the total instalment credit granted by retail dealers. Plummer & Young,
Sales Finance Companies and Their Credit Practices 43, 264 (1940).
11 In 1926 there were estimates ranging from 800 to 1700 independent companies.
Plummer, W. C., "Social and Economic Consequences of Buying on the Instalment Plan,"
129 Annals 1, 19 (Supp. 1927).
12 Plummer & Young, supra note 10, at 20-21; Cox, The Economics of Instal-
ment Buying 345 (1948); Phelps, Instalment Sales Financing 22 (1953).
33 Nugent and Henderson, "Installment Selling and the Consumer: A Brief for Regu-
lation," 173 Annals 93, 102 (1934); N.Y. Legal Aid Society's position on U.C.C. 9-206(1)
(1952 ed.), N.Y. Law Rev. Comm'n Rep. 1046-51 (1954).
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represent their credit status, resist collections, or use their promise as a
passport to bankruptcy.14 Still another attitude reflects fear that con-
trols over instalment financing may inordinately interfere with a device
which, together with advertising, has filled millions of American homes
with an unprecedented number of cars, washing machines, vacuum
cleaners, and other modern necessaries of life. 5 Finally, some profes-
sionals in the general lending field regard regulatory schemes as tools
for eliminating unfair competitive practices of a segment of the in-
dustry."8
A sketch of the usual transaction may furnish some idea of the com-
plexity of the problem and some of the possible factual distinctions. 7
The buyer has three potential choices when he decides to purchase. He
may (1) pay cash, (2) borrow the money from a lending institution, or
(3) purchase under a deferred payment arrangement with the seller.
Although the last two may be but different means of accomplishing the
same end, the third alternative is our main concern. In purchasing on
the basis of a deferred payment the buyer makes an essentially tripartite
arrangement. The buyer, dealer, and financing agency each come into
relationships with one another. The deal itself has three aspects:
(1) The sales transaction,
(2) The promise to pay, usually negotiable in form, and
(3) The creation of an in rem security interest in favor
of the seller.
The security interest is usually in the form of a conditional sale or a
chattel mortgage, depending primarily upon the statutory scheme within
a given state. It is aimed primarily at giving the seller a power to realize
payment of the obligation by seizure of the goods in the event of the
buyer's default, insolvency, or bankruptcy, although it also provides
some protection against the risk of the buyer's dishonesty. A further
purpose of the security interest is to induce the buyer to pay out of
fear of losing the property.
After having made his agreement with the buyer, the dealer, often as
14 Phelps, Financing the Instalment Purchase 88 (1954).
15 Kripke, "The 'Secured Transactions' Provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code,"
35 Va. L. Rev. 577, 612-15 (1949); Position of the New York Clearing House on U.C.C.
9-206(1) (1952 ed.), N.Y. Law Rev. Comm'n Rep. 1100, 1106-08 (1954).
16 Hubachek, "The Drift Toward a Consumer Credit Code," 16 U. Chi. L. Rev. 609,
616, 634 (1949).
17 For descriptions of the mechanics of sales financing, see: Cox, The Economics of
Instalment Buying (1948); Plummer & Young, Sales Finance Companies and Their Credit
Practises (1940); and Retail Instalment Selling, Research Report No. 6, Maryland Legis-
lative Council, Research Division (1940). A short treatment appears in Adelson, "The
Mechanics of the Instalment Credit Sale," 2 Law & Contemp. Prob. 218 (1935).
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a result of a previous arrangement, then transfers the contract to the
financing institution and receives a discounted payment in return. The
buyer is then indebted to the financing institution.
Turning from this brief synopsis of a perhaps overgeneralized trans-
action and its legal and social setting, we may set forth the scheme of the
balance of this analysis. After a short review of the impact of other
law, we will examine the safeguards provided at the time of the sale,
during the credit extension, and upon default. We will then turn to the
consequences of violating the consumer protection requirements. Follow-
ing this, we will examine the question of the coverage of the acts. The
latter topic is the final consideration, since it seems preferable to deal
with the scope of the statutes after surveying the abuses and some
of the remedies provided. We can then more carefully consider whether
these controls should be limited to motor vehicle sales, to consumer
goods transactions generally, or be extended to all instalment sales. New
York, for example, has two separate acts: one governing motor vehicle
sales, and the other consumer goods generally."8
II. LEGAL FRAMEWORK WITHIN WHICH THE CONTROLS OPERATE
The utilization of the instalment sales device brings all sorts of law
into play. The law of sales governs the seller-buyer relationship. 9 The
law of negotiable instruments deals with the rights and obligations of
all the parties to the note.2" Their position after the transfer of the note
may be affected by the law of assignments. Finally the law of chattel
security operates upon the in rem rights of the dealer and his successor
in interest, the financing institution. It is here that the lack of uniformity
from state to state and within a given state is most apparent.
Chattel mortgages have been described as wholly creatures of statute.2'
All but one of the forty-eight states enacted chattel mortgage statutes
prior to the growth of the instalment sales industry. For the most part
these statutes were aimed at providing a recording system for the protec-
tion of third parties dealing with the mortgagor who remained in posses-
18 N.Y. Pers. Prop. Law §§ 301-11 controls motor vehicle sales, and N.Y. Pers. Prop.
Law §§ 401-18 covers other instalment transactions.
19 Only thirty-four states adopted the Uniform Sales Act. 1 Unif. Laws Ann. 6 (Supp.
1956). Three of these, Pennsylvania, Massachusetts, and Kentucky, have repealed the act
by adopting the Uniform Commercial Code, Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 12A (1954), effective July 1,
1954; Mass. Acts of 1957, c. 765, effective October 1, 1958; Ky. Laws 1958, S.B. No. 169,
effective July 1, 1960.
20 All forty-eight states adopted the Uniform Negotiable Instruments Act, 5 Unif. Laws
Ann. 6 (Supp. 1956). Pennsylvania in 1953, Massachusetts in 1957, and Kentucky in 1958
left this group by enacting the Uniform Commercial Code, supra note 19.
21 Glenn, Fraudulent Conveyances § 491a (1940), and Glenn, "The Chattel Mortgage
as a Statutory Security," 25 Va. L. Rev. 316, 338-39 (1939). But see, Ward v. Summer,
22 Mass. (5 Pick.) 59 (1827).
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sion of the goods.22 The borrower's protection, through judicial recog-
nition of an equity of redemption and control of the "fairness" of the
resale price, was built into the theory of the chattel mortgage.2 3
The conditional sale evolved under a different legal theory than the
chattel mortgage but accomplished the same business purpose.24 Apart
from statutory controls the conditional vendor had a choice of two in-
consistent remedies upon the buyer's default and was called upon to
elect (1) to proceed against the goods and recapture them from the
buyer; or (2) to recover the purchase price. This doctrine of conditional
sales law aided the buyers and balanced the advantage given to sellers
who were permitted to retake the goods without liability to repay any
of the prior instalments.25 The Uniform Conditional Sales Act was
drafted upon the premise that chattel mortgages and conditional sales
should be treated alike by the law, since they have identical objects and
effects; but that act retained each in a separate category. It is noteworthy
that this uniform law was approved by the Commissioners in 1918 before
the enormous expansion in consumer instalment selling subsequent to
World War I. For this reason its provisions are often geared to the
business rather than the consumer transaction., It has been enacted in
only twelve jurisdictions, but other states have acted to alter the reme-
dies of the vendor 2 7 The Uniform Commercial Code carries the basic
premise of the Uniform Conditional Sales Act one step further when it
totally abandons the conceptual distinction between chattel mortgages
and conditional sales2
Thus, retail instalment sales acts enter this rather complex arena of
interaction among various artificial divisions of the law. The compart-
ments are not airtight and are frequently poorly integrated. Obviously,
&e regulation of the area must be accomplished on the basis of thought-
ful adjustment of the law of sales, negotiable instruments, and chattel
security, in light of the real needs of the buyer under the instalment sale.
Hasty tinkering may bring lasting damage to predictability of result;
worse, it may defeat the purpose of consumer protection.
22 South Carolina's act of 1698 was apparently the first chattel mortgage statute and
was followed by many southern states in the eighteenth century and the northern states
in the nineteenth century. Durfee, Cases on Security 490-91 (1951). Louisiana held out
until 1918. Glenn, supra note 21. Pennsylvania waited until 1945, Acts 1945, No. 434.
23 Gilmore and Axelrod, "Chattel Security," 57 Yale L.J. 517, 529, 531-32 (1948).
24 Bogert, "Commentaries on Conditional Sales," 2A Unif. Laws Ann. § 10.
25 Hanna, Cases and Materials on Security 284-86 (1940).
26 One writer concludes that this is the reason for the provision authorizing the seller
to cut off the buyer's power of redemption by notice of intention to repossess. Donald-
son, "An Analysis of Retail Installment Sales Legislation," 19 Rocky Mt. L. Rev. 135,
158 (1947); see note 118 infra.
27 2 Unif. Laws Ann 6 (1956 Supp.)
28 Comment, U.C.C. 9-101 (1952 ed.).
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III. PROTECTION AFFORDED AT THE TIME OF THE SALE
A. Disclosure. Since the consumer, at least in theory, can choose
to use cash, an ordinary loan, or an instalment sales plan, much of the
thrust of the instalment sales legislation has been to make this a rela-
tively free and informed choice. The competitive race for the buyer's
credit business has led to the adoption of many devices which screen
the actual cost of buying on time. To prevent this abuse, all regulatory
statutes are based, at least in part, on a philosophy of disclosure.29
Typical in this respect are the provisions of the New York act dealing
with motor vehicle sales. They assure that the buyer actually receives
the required information and that he has a source of reference for deter-
mining his rights during the life of the contract by requiring that the
contract be in writing and signed by both parties.3 0 In this manner the
seller as well as the buyer is chargeable with knowledge of the contract's
contents, particularly in the event of noncompliance with the other
mandatory terms of the act. Strangely, the New York motor vehicle
act requires that both parties sign the contract, while the separate act
covering other goods is silent on that point. 31 Coupled with the demand
for a signed writing is the further necessity for the delivery of an
executed copy of the contract to the buyer."2 Although a period of grace
29 Federal activity in this area is bottomed on the same concept. The Federal Trade
Commissions' Trade Practice Rules Relating to the Sales and Financing of Motor Vehicles
requires disclosure. 16 C.F.R. §§ 197-1-.5 (Supp. 1957). Difficulties in federal enforce-
ment encouraged a willingness to relinquish control over such regulation where state law
protects consumers. This indicates an intent to induce state action. Note, 61 Yale L.J.
718, 725 (1952); Statement, W. A. Ayres, Acting Chairman, F.T.C., 5 Pers. Fin. L.Q.
Rep. 35 (1951). The now extinct Regulation W, of the Federal Resirve Board, though
aimed primarily at controlling consumer loan volume, at one time had disclosure require-
ments. Legislation, 63 Harv. L. Rev. 874, 875 (1950); See 32 A, C.F.R. c. XV, Reg. W.§ 6(2)(c)(4) (1951). Finally, in the period prior to World War II, a proposed code of
fair competition for the sales finance companies contained provisions for informing the
buyer. Cavers, "The Consumer's Stake in the Finance Company Code Controversy," 2 L.
& Contemp. Prob. 200, 203 (1935).
30 N.Y. § 302. A writing is also required in Cal. § 2982a; Colo. § 13-16-6(1); Conn.§ 6699(a) 1, § 6699(f); Fla. § 520.07(a)(1); Idaho § 64-806; IIl. § 224; Ind. § 58-902;
Iowa § 322.3; Kan. § 7a; Ky. § 190.100; Me. § 254 I A; Md. § 116a; Mass. G.L. c. 255,
§§ 1, 12; Mich. § 492.112(a); Minn. § 6a(1); Miss. § 26(a)(1); Neb. § 60-617; Nev.
§ 97.020(1); N.J. § 6a(1); N.Y. § 402; N.D. § 2(1); Ohio § 1317.02; Ore. § 2; Pa.
§ 613A; S.D. § 3(1); Utah § 15-1 to -2a(B); Va. § 46-532; Wis. § 6a. (For full citation
see notes 2 and 3 supra.) See also U.C.C. 9-203 (1957 ed.).
31 Compare N.Y. Pers. Prop. Law § 302 with § 402. Both parties must sign under:
Cal. § 2982a; Fla. § 520-07(a) (1); Idaho § 64-806; fI1. 9 224; Iowa § 322.3; Kan. § 7a;
Me. § 254 I A; Md. § 116a; Mich. § 492.112(a); Minn. 9 6a(1); Miss. § 26(a) (1); Neb.
§ 60-617; Nev. § 97.020(1); N.D. § 2(1); Ohio § 1317.02; Ore. § 2; Pa. § 613a; Utah
§ 15-1-2a(B); Wis. §§ 6a, 6c. The buyer alone must sign under: Colo. § 13-16-6(1)(a);
Conn. § 6699(a) 1, § 6699(f); Ind. § 58-902; Ky. § 190.100; N.J. § 6a(1); N.Y. § 402;
S.D. § 3(1); Va. § 46-532. Compare with these provisions U.C.C. 9-203 (1957 ed.). (For
full citation see notes 2 and 3 supra.)
32 Cal. § 2982a; Colo. § 13-16-6(1) (a); Conn. §§ 6699(a) 1, 6699 (f); Fla. § 520.07(a)
(3); Idaho § 64.806; II. § 226; Ind. § 58-902; Iowa added § 1; Kan. § 7d; Ky.
§ 190.100; Me. § 254 I C; Md. § 116b; Mich. § 492.112c; Minn. § 6a(1); Miss. § 26-
(a)(3); Neb. § 60-617; Nev. § 97.020(1); N.J. § 6a(1); N.Y. § 302(3) and § 405;
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is generally allowed the seller to enable him to carry out this obligation,
in some of the acts the penalty for a violation is rather severe. Until
the goods sold are delivered, the buyer is given a power to cancel
the contract and the right to recover both his payment in cash and any
goods "traded in" to the seller.33 If the article traded has been sold,
it seems wise to provide specifically for the recovery of its value.34 It is
of questionable soundness to limit the buyer's power to rescind the con-
tract to cases where he has not received delivery of the goods. Normally,
restitutionary remedies are available so long as the plaintiff offers to
restore the goods received.35 If the notion is bottomed upon the similar
exception to the operation of the Statute of Frauds in sales cases, there
seems to be little analogy in policy considerations, and the seller is not
here excused upon a partial delivery.36 Maryland rejects this limitation
on the buyer's power to rescind and dictates not only that the buyer be
given a copy of the contract, but also that he be given a receipt for any
down payment prior to that time.37  There may well be areas where
this copy requirement is unreasonably burdensome or pointless. Illinois
seems to have isolated such a case when it exempted contractual docu-
ments sent by the buyer under terms set forth in a mail-order catalog
or announcement. 8
The concept of disclosure and an apprehension that blanks in the
instrument invite overreaching and fraud by the seller result in their
prohibition.39 Balancing the business necessities against this considera-
N.D. § 2(3); Ohio § 1317.02; Ore. § 4; Pa. § 613c; S.D. § 3(1); Utah § 15-1 to -2(a)(B);
Va. § 46-532; Wis. § 6c. (For full citation see notes 2 and 3 supra.)
33 Fla. § 520.07(a)(3); Ill. § 226; Me. § 254 I C; Md. § 116b; Miss. § 26(a)(3); Ore.§ 4. (For full citation see notes 2 and 3 supra.)
34 Fla. Stat. Ann. § 520.07(a) (3) (Supp. No. 6, 1957) ; Miss. Laws 1958, H.B. 25-X, No.
26(a) (3), 1 C.C.H. Cond. Sale Chat. Mortg. Rep. 8474.
35 An offer of restoration is a condition precedent to the restitutionary remedy for
breach of warranty or breach of contract. Uniform Sales Act § 69(3) ; Restatement, Con-
tracts § 349 (1932); 5 Corbin, Contracts § 1114 (1951). A similar requirement exists where
the claim is based upon fraud or mistake. Restatement, Restitution § 65 (1937).
36 The policy considerations behind the state consumer statutes appear to be based
upon equalizing the bargaining position of the uninformed buying group against an occa-
sionally unscrupulous selling group. Donaldson, supra note 26, at 136. On the other hand,
the Statutes of Frauds in § 4 of the Uniform Sales Act and U.C.C. 2-201 are founded
upon the protection of both buyers and sellers against claims based upon fictitious con-
tracts. 2 Corbin, Contracts § 498 (1951). For an interesting account of some business-
men's reasons for the Statute of Frauds see, Comment, 66 Yale LJ. 1038, 1058, 1060
(1957).
37 Kan. § 7d; Md. § 116 (for full citation see notes 2 and 3 supra). Maryland also
provides that such a receipt must disclose to the buyer the right of cancellation for failure
to deliver a copy of the contract. In Stride v. Martin, 184 Md. 446, 41 A.2d 489 (1945),
the buyer was permitted to recover all the money paid and the value of a trade-in where
the copy delivered to him was unsigned by the seller and contained blanks.
38 Ill. Ann. Stat. c. 121 3/2, § 230 (Smith-Hurd Supp. No. 3 1957). See also, § 226
(excluding custom made goods).
39 Conn. § 6699(a) 1; Fla. § 520.07(f); Ill. § 229; Kan. § 7(1); Me. § 254VI; Md.
116b; Mich. § 492.112(b); Miss. § 26(g); N.Y. § 302(8), § 402(4); N.D. § 2(8); Ore.
§ 8; Pa. §§ 613B, 615; Wis. § 6(c). (For full citation see notes 2 and 3 supra.)
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tion, several statutes permit blanks for the later insertion of serial num-
bers more specifically identifying the goods.4" Some also permit the
insertion of the date of the first payment.41
Since the financing agency may take an assignment of the contract
without knowledge of the seller's failure to comply with either the
mandate of a delivery of a copy of the contract or the prohibition against
blanks, a policy issue arises as to whether the assignee should be pro-
tected. Protection seems to depend upon the presence of a sufficiently
conspicuous acknowledgment clause.42 As noted, in some statutes such
an acknowledgment by the buyer creates a conclusive presumption of
compliance. This operates to insulate both the seller and the assignee
with or without notice. To permit the seller to shield himself in this
fashion by what will become a standard "boiler-plate" contract provision
is to condone violation of the copy requirement and the prohibition upon
blanks. The more limited protection of the assignee without knowledge
can be justified by considering that such a result enhances the flow of
the paper and is most practically consistent with the mass production
nature of the business. Those same considerations furnish a pragmatic
basis for protecting even an assignee with knowledge, since this is the
only means whereby the issue of knowledge is eliminated from litigation.
An additional device of disclosure informs the buyer of his legal status
under the regulatory act. Maryland, for example, demands that the
contract contain in twelve point bold type, or larger, a notice of the
buyer's rights:
NOTICE TO BUYER
1. You are entitled to a copy of this agreement at the time you sign it.
2. Under the state law regulating instalment sales, you have certain
rights, among others:
(1) to pay off the full amount due in advance and obtain a partial
rebate of the finance charge.
(2) to redeem the property repossessed for a default.
(3) to require under certain conditions a resale of the property if
repossessed.43
40 Conn. § 6699(a) 1; Fla. § 520.07(f); 1I1. § 229; Kan. § 7(1); Me. § 254VI; Miss.
§ 26(g); N.Y. §§ 302(8), 402(4); N.D. § 2(8); Ore. § 8; Pa. § 615; Wis. § 6(c). (For
full citation see notes 2 and 3 supra.)
41 Fla. § 520.07(f); Ill. § 229; Kan. § 7(1); Me. § 254VI; Miss. § 26(g); N.D.
§ 2(8); Ore. § 8. (For full citation see notes 2 and 3 supra.)
42 Protects seller and assignee: Fla. § 520.07(f); Ind. § 58-902; Me. § 254 VI; Miss.
§ 26(g). Protects all assignees: Colo. § 13-16-6(5); Conn. § 6699(g); Iowa added § 1;
Ky. § 190.100(6); Minn. § 6e; NJ. § 6e; Ohio § 1317.02 (prima facie proof); S.D. § 3(9).
Protects assignee without knowledge: Ill. § 229; Kan. § 7(1); Md. § 136; N.Y. §§ 302(8),
405; N.D. § 2(8); Ore. § 4. Two states make an acknowledgment mandatory: Mich.
§ 492.112(e) ; Pa. § 613E. (For full citation see notes 2 and 3 supra.) Where the statute is
silent, such an acknowledgment has been held to be substantial evidence of compliance.
Millick v. Peer, 130 Cal. App. 2d 894, 279 P.2d 212 (1955).
43 Md. § 117c. Similar notices are required by Conn. § 6699(c) (motor vehicles only);
Fla. § 520.07(a)(2); Ill. § 224; Iowa § 58-902; Kan. § 7b; Ky. § 190.100(2); Me.
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As against an' unscrupulous seller these rather indefinite disclosures
seem to be of little value, since he can fill their content with misleading
or fraudulent representations as to the particular requirement. Their
maximum value seems to be that the buyer is informed of the fact of
state regulation. More explicit provisions would serve only to defeat
the purpose of disclosure because the buyer could conceivably be over-
whelmed by the detail of the contracts. This may even now be one of
the causes of failing to read the contract or of signing it when it contains
blanks.
B. Control of Excessive Finance Charges. Rate fixing and dis-
closure, alone or in combination, have been employed in combating the
major problem in instalment sales financing, the unreasonable or exorbi-
tant finance charge. General usury laws are largely impotent in dealilfg
with the problem because of the distinction drawn between a "sale on
credit" and a "loan." Thus if a buyer borrows the money in an
independent loan transaction, the rate of interest will be controlled by
any general usury law or the applicable small loan law within the jurisdic-
tion.4 4 On the other hand, if he selects the instalment sale method, the
sale is usually held to be without the scope of those laws. The finance
or credit charges are labeled as a part of the sale price and not interest
upon a loan.45 Seldom is the distinction drawn for anything other than
this conceptual reason.46 As in the case of small loans, the risk and cost
§ 254IB2; Mich. § 492.112(d), 492.113(b)(9); Miss. § 26(a)(2); N.Y. §§ 302(2),
402(2); N.D. § 2(2)(c); Ore. § 3; Pa. §§ 613D, 614. (For full citation see notes 2
and 3 supra.)
44 Horack, "A Survey of the General Usury Laws," 8 Law & Contemp. Prob. 36 (1941);
Hubachek, "Development of Regulatory Small Loan Laws," 8 Law & Contemp. Prob. 108
(1941); Hubachek, "Progress and Problems in Regulation of Consumer Credit," 19 Law
& Contemp. Prob. 4 (1954); Barrett, Compilation of Consumer Finance Laws (1952).
45 The result indicated usually follows if the finance charge is levied in connection with
a bona fide time price, e.g., Commercial Credit Co. v. Tarwater, 215 Ala. 123, 110 So. 39
(1926) ; Bell v. Idaho Finance Co., 73 Idaho 560, 255 P.2d 715 (1953); General Motors
Accept. Corp. v. Weinrich, 218 Mo. App. 68, 262 S.W. 425 (1924); McNish v. General
Credit Corp., 164 Neb. 526, 83 N.W.2d 1 (1957) (small loan rate applies); Nazarian
v. Lincoln Finance Corp., 77 R.I. 497, 78 A.2d 7 (1951) (not bona fide, therefore usuri-
ous). See Note, 143 A.L.R. 238 (1943). For an interesting series of cases in a court
which abandoned the distinction, see: Sloan v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 3 CCH Cond. Sale
Chat. Mortg. Rep. § 14140 (Ark. 1957); General Contract Corp. v. Duke, 223 Ark.
938, 270 S.W.2d 918 (1954); Hare v. General Contract Purchase Corp., 220 Ark. 601,
249 S.W.2d 973 (1952). Similarly the fifth circuit held that the federal usury law,
12 U.S.C.A. § 85 (1945), applies to national banks discounting instalment paper. Daniel
v. First National Bank of Birmingham, 227 F.2d 353 (5th Cir. 1955), rehearing denied,
228 F.2d 803 (1956). Generally, see Notes, 18 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 648 (1957); 65 Yale L.J.
105 (1955); 31 Texas L. Rev. 55 (1952); 71 Harv. L. Rev. 1143 (1958).
46 Compare Berger, "Usury in Instalment Sales," 2 Law & Contemp. Prob. 148 (1935)
attacking the distinction with Ecker, "Commentary on 'Usury in Instalment Sales'," 2 Law
& Contemp. Prob. 173 (1935) defending it. Corbin's rationalization of the rule seems to
ignore the profit motives of the seller and the finance company:
In some cases the result may be as harmful to one who buys a car beyond his means
as would have been the borrowing of money at a usurious rate. But is a poor man
to be prevented from having a car merely because he is prevented from borrowing
money? Besides, the financing system distributes the risk so that those who can not
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of instalment selling may be greater than in the ordinary loan of money.
This can be taken into consideration in any statutory rate-making plan.
The fluidity of such risks and costs might be guarded against through
a rate-making authority. 7 Absent such controls in the usury laws or
the instalment sales laws, the seller and the finance company are limited
solely by competitive considerations.4 8
Where explicit rate-making has not been adopted, disclosure is the
rule in the apparent hope that if the buyer could be protected against
deception, competitive forces would operate to keep the rate down. Of
the more recent statutes the Illinois provisions are typical.49 The contract
must list:
(1) the cash sale price of the goods;(2) the amount of the buyer's down payment in money and goods with a
brief description of the goods;
(3) the difference between these two;
(4) the amount, if any, charged for insurance and other benefits, specify-
ing the coverages and benefits;
(5) the amount of official fees;
(6) the principal balance which is the sum of items (3), (4) and (5);(7) the finance charge, stated either in a per cent of the monthly unpaid
balances or as a dollar amount;
(8) the time balance, the sum of items (6) and (7), expressed in number
and amount of instalments and the due date or period thereof;
(9) the total time sale price.
A somewhat unusual provision in the Illinois act is the permission
granted to the seller in automobile sales to lump insurance charges with
the finance charge in the contract upon the condition that within twenty
days he sends the buyer a memorandum noting the separate charges. °
pay have the use of the car at the expense, in part, of those who can.
6 Corbin, Contracts § 1500 (1951).
47 One state is experimenting with a rate making board in the small loan field. In
1956 the Massachusetts legislature created an administrative board to investigate the neces-
sary facts and to establish from time to time a maximum rate of charge for small loans
up to $1500. Mass. Ann. Laws c. 140, § 100 (1957); Gahan, "Massachusetts Creates Small
Loan Rate Fixing Board," 10 Pers. Fin. L.Q. Rep. 117 (1956). While loans by trust
companies, savings banks, cooperative banks, savings and loan associations, credit unions,
national banking associations, and federal savings and loan associations are not subject to
the other regulatory controls governing small loans, their rate of charge is within the
control of the board. Mass. Ann. Laws c. 140, § 114A (1957). Rate hearings were held
in the fall of 1957. Note, 12 Pers. Fin. L.Q. Rep. 30 (1957). Cf. Indiana, infra note 54.
48 In 1955 the median finance charge for new cars was $11.00 per hundred, and the
range was from less than $7.00 per hundred to more than $15.00 per hundred. Consumer
Instalment Credit, Part IV, Federal Reserve Board, p. 73 (1957) (hereinafter cited 1957
F.R.B. Study).
49 Ill. § 225. See also: Cal. § 2982a; Colo. § 13-16-6(2); Conn. §§ 6699(b), 6699(f);
Fla. § 520.07(a)(4); Idaho § 64-806; Ind. § 58-904; Iowa §322.3(6)(c); Kan. § 7(f);
Ky. § 190.100(2); Me. §§ 25411, 2541B 2; Md. § 117; Mass. § 12; Mich. § 492.113;
Minn. § 6b; Miss. § 26(b); Neb. § 60-617; Nev. § 97.020(2); N.J. § 6b; N.Y. §§ 302
(4)-(5), 402(3); N.D. § 2(4)-(5); Ohio § 1317.04; Ore. § 5; S.D. § 3(5); Pa. § 614B;
Utah § 15-1 to -2a; Va. § 46-532; Wis. § 6b. (For full citation see notes 2 and 3 supra.)
50 Ill. § 225. Substantially the same permission exists in Ind. § 58-904; Me. § 254 II D;
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Easing the requirement in this fashion clearly permits depriving the
buyer of necessary information in determining at the time of the sale
whether to secure his insurance through the dealer or elsewhere.
Earnest claims have been made that the finance charge should be ex-
pressed in both the dollar amount and as a rate of interest per annum,
or rate of interest per month on the declining balance." These formula-
tions of the finance charges are urged because they will enable the buyer
to judge better the cost of competing means of financing the purchase:
for example, most small loan laws require the expression of rate per
month on the declining balance.5" These claims have received little re-
sponse from legislatures, probably because of a fear of cluttering up the
contract and the adoption by competing agencies of the dollar amount
method in their solicitations. 3
In those instances where flat statutory rate fixing is employed, the
utility of disclosure requirements is not diminished, since a complete
itemization of the time price readily reveals compliance or noncom-
pliance with the rate regulation. Most of the more recent statutes adopt
the rate-fixing technique. 54 It is particularly the trend where the statute
is limited to motor vehicle sales. Maine's statute sets a maximum rate
dependent upon the age of the vehicle:
Notwithstanding the provisions of any other law, the finance charge shall
not exceed the following rates:
Group 1. Any new motor vehicle designated by the manufacturer by a
year model not earlier than the year in which the sale is made, $7.00 per
$100 per year.
Group 2. Any new motor vehicle not in class 1, and any used motor
vehicle designated by the manufacturer by a year model of the same or
not more than three years prior to the year in which the sale is made,
$11.00 per $100 per year.
N.J. § 6b; and Ohio § 1317.04. (For full citation see notes 2 and 3 supra.) See also,
the statement that this sort of provision makes the state statute an inadequate substitute
for Federal Trade Commission control. Ayres' Statement, supra note 29, at 38.
51 Foster, W. T. and Foster, L. R., "Rate Aspects of Instalment Legislation," 2 Law
& Contemp. Prob. 189, 192 (1935); Donaldson, supra note 26, at 145; Note, 101 U. Pa.
L. Rev. 530, 536 (1953).
52 Barrett, supra note 44.
53 Maximum finance charges expressed in percentage rates do exist in Cal. § 2982c
(1% of unpaid balance times the number of months or $25.00); Iowa added § 3(a);
Nev. § 97.040; Pa. § 619; and S.D. § 4. (For full citation see notes 2 and 3 supra.) There
is current ferment in the small loan area about a middle ground between the interest on
unpaid balances approach and the add-on approach; i.e., "precomputation." This retains
the statement of charges in terms per month but permits as an alternate method the
application of each payment to the combined total of principal and scheduled charges. See
"A Symposium on Precomputation," 12 Pers. Fin. L.Q. 4-16 (1957).
54 1958 Acts: Kan. § 8a; Miss. § 27; 1957 Acts: Fla. § 520.08; Iowa added § 3; Minn.
§ 7a; N.D. § 3(1); Ore. § 19; S.D. § 4. Prior Acts: Cal. § 2982c; Conn, § 6699(i); Ind.
§ 58-906; Ky. § 190.110(1); Me. § 255 I; Md. § 119A; Mich. § 492.118; Nev. § 97.040;
N.Y. §§ 303, 404, 413(3); Ohio § 1317.06; Pa. § 619; Utah § 15-1 to -2a; Wis. § 6b.
(For full citation see notes 2 and 3 supra.)
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Group 3. Any used motor vehicle not in Class 2, $13.00 per $100 per
year.55
In any event the seller is there entitled to a minimum total finance
charge of twenty-five dollars.5 6 Considerable care must be taken where
the act is not limited to motor vehicles. The New York legislation in-
dicates that it may be necessary to establish varying rates dependent
upon the kind of goods involved. It permits, in some cases, a much higher
rate in its general act than in the motor vehicle act.57
Unavoidably connected to specific rate regulation is the problem of
dealer participation. Because of the competitive race for the consumer's
business, some financing agencies offer the dealer a share of the finance
charge as an inducement to his persuading the buyer to use that firm's
plan. This occurs in a variety of fashions. Some methods depend upon
the transfer to the finance agency being upon a recourse or repurchase
basis. In theory, at least, by crediting the dealer with part of the finance
charge, a reserve is set up from which claims against the dealer may
be paid. If no such claims are paid, the dealer has the benefit of the
fund.58 Another method is the outright payment of part of the finance
charge or of the "pack," that is, the amount charged by the dealer in
excess of that called for in the financing agency's rate chart.
All four of the states which have attempted to strike at these practices
have done so in connection with rate-fixing regulation.59 One abandoned
the field when it found that the limitation was unconstitutional "price-
fixing" legislation. 60 The area is one which seems to call for control,
particularly where the original finance rates are regulated. Otherwise,
55 Maine § 255 I. Rates are also set in California, Connecticut (rate regulation limited
to motor vehicles), Florida, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Maryland (rate regulation limit-
ed to motor vehicles), Michigan, Mississippi, Nebraska, Nevada, North Dakota, Oregon,
Pennsylvania, South Dakota and Wisconsin.
56 Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. c. 59, § 255 11 (Supp. 1957).
57 Compare N.Y. Pers. Prop. Law § 303 with §§ 404 and 413(3).
58 The delay in payment induced the court in Johnson v. Comm'r, 233 F.2d 952 (4th
Cir. 1956), to hold that such amounts were not taxable income to a dealer on an accrual
basis when credited to the dealer's account. The Tax Court has refused to follow the
decision. Brodsky, 27 T.C. 216 (1956).
59 Indiana §§ 58-906, 910, 926; Mich. § 492.131(c); Ohio § 1317.08; Wis. § 3. (For
full citation see notes 2 and 3 supra.)
60 Dept. of Financial Institutions v. Holt, 231 Ind. 293, 108 N.E.2d 629 (1952), held
that statutory provisions allowing administrative restrictions on dealer participation was
an unconstitutional interference with the dealer's freedom of contract. Contra, Teegardin
v. Foley, 166 Ohio St. 449, 143 N.E.2d 824 (1957). Legislative response permitted such
control of participation as part of a scheme to eliminate monopolies. Ind. Ann. Stat.§§ 58-935-45 (Supp. 1957). This too received unkind treatment by the Supreme Court of
Indiana, which set aside a cease and desist order relating to dealer participation under
the act, since there was no proof of monopoly nor proof of agreement tending to create
a monopoly. Department of Financial Institutions v. Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp., -
Ind. -, 146 N.E.2d 93 1957). See also Hardy, "Another View on the Origin of Dealer
Participation in Automobile Finance Charges," 30 Ind. L.J. 311 (1955); Pecar, "Dealer Par-
ticipation in Automobile Finance Charges: A Reply," 30 Ind. L.J. 319 (1955); Note, 28
Ind. LJ. 641 (1953).
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the maximum rates will have a tendency to become the minimum also.
Furthermore, formulation of future rate charges will be based upon
costs of the dealer's participation, and the buyer will thus bear an ex-
pense which has but slight relation to the risks attendant upon the
extension of credit. The fact that the dealer may assume a contingent
liability for the buyer's default can be adequately considered in setting
the limits on participation. 1 Incentives offered the dealer shade off into
other forms, including the low cost of financing of the dealer's own
inventory. This is done because the financing agency expects to obtain
a large share of the dealer's consumer contracts. 2 Such collateral induce-
ments seem to be beyond the practical scope of regulatory control, and
the buyer himself probably benefits from the dealer's own low cost
financing.
Control of refinancing charges, rebates on prepayment, and insurance
premiums and practices, are all questions intimately allied to rate fixing.
Of these only insurance will be considered here; the remainder are
treated under the discussion of protections afforded during the credit
extension, in section IV.
C. Insurance. One of the risks attendant upon this kind of financing
is the damage or destruction of the goods. The appropriate safeguard is
insurance to protect the secured party against such perils. Numerous
problems directly concerning the buyer arise here. One relates to cover-
age. As the ownership of the property is divided so are the risks to the
goods. Both parties are concerned with coverage against fire, theft,
collision, and the like. In the automobile transaction in particular, the
buyer is independently concerned with liability insurance covering both
personal injury and property damage. This has led some legislatures
to enact requirements of specific disclosure of the presence or absence
of such coverage in automobile sales.63 Another problem which arises is
that one of the methods used to hide an excessive finance charge is to
include an inordinate charge for insurance on the goods. 4 In other
cases the credit charge is lumped together with the insurance premium,
61 None of the states controlling participation prohibit it. For example, Ohio sets a
maximum of 2% of the principal balance. Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 1317.08.
62 Skilton, "Cars for Sale: Some Comments on the Wholesale Financing of Automo-
biles," 1957 Wis. L. Rev. 352, 355; Note, 60 Yale L.J. 1218, 1222 (1951).
63 Colo, § 13-16-6(2)(d); Fla. § 520.07(a)(2); II1. Ann. Stat. c. 95 Y2, § 58p; Kan.
§ 7(c); Ky. § 190.100(3); Me. § 254 I B.1; Mich. § 492.113, as amended by Acts 1957, S.B.
No. 1026, 1 CCH Cond. Sale Chat. Mortg. Rep. 787; Md. § 117b; Miss. § 26(a)(2);
ND. § 2(2)b (not limited to motor vehicles); Ore. § 3; S.D. § 3(6); Va. § 46-532;
Wis. § 6m. (For full citation see notes 2 and 3 supra.)
64 Car insurance premiums were included in slightly less than one half of the new
car contracts in 1955, and credit life premiums were incorporated into one third of such
contracts in 1954 and two fifths of such contracts in 1955. 1957 F.R.B. Study, p. 76,
supra note 48.
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obscuring the cost of each and permitting manipulation and misrepre-
sentation in the oral negotiations. The requirements of separate itemiza-
tion of insurance premiums and specification of coverage in the contract
go far to ameliorate these conditions.65 Some statutes attack the problem
of excessive charges for insurance by providing that the premiums may
not exceed the rates filed with the state insurance administrator for
similar coverage, or those specified in a standard insurance manual.66
Furthermore, there is almost universal concern in the retail instalment
sales legislation with coercive practices in the sale of insurance by the
seller." To the extent that this is a problem in light of present day
competition among sellers, the statutory formulations of relief are rather
ineffective, since they permit the seller to reject an insurer obtained by
the buyer. Such a safeguard of the seller's control of the insurer seems
quite proper, since the seller has an interest in the insurance; but limita-
tion on this power of approval could well be made part of the statute.68
Besides the destruction of the goods a second risk in the instalment
transaction is the loss of the buyer's earning power through death or
disability. Credit life, health, and accident insurance policies are
employed against this peril on an ever increasing basis. On the theory
that "no man's debts should live after him," this method of insurance
was instituted some forty years ago. The benefit to the debtor's family
65 Itemization of insurance premiums: Cal. § 2982a; Colo. § 13-16-6(2); Conn.
§ 6699(b); Fla. § 520.07(a)(4); Ill. § 225; Ind. § 58-904; Iowa § 322.3(6)(c); Kan.
7(f)(4),(5),(6); Ky. § 190.100(2), (3); Me. § 254IID; Md. § 117(6); Mass. § 12; Mich.
§ 492.113; Minn. § 6b(4); 2Miss. § 26(b) (4); Neb. § 60-617; N.J. § 6b; N.Y. §§ 302(4)1
402(3); N.D. § 2(5); Ohio § 1317.04; Ore. § 5; Pa. § 614B4; S.D. § 3(5); Utah
§ 15-1 to -2a; Va. § 46-536; Wis. § 6b. Specification of Coverage: Colo. § 13-16-6(2);
Conn. § 6699(b); Ind. § 58-902; Iowa § 322-3(6)(c); Kan. § 7(f)(4),(5),(6); Ky.
§ 190.100(2)(d); Me. § 254 II D; Md. § 117(6); Minn. § 6b(4); Miss. § 26(b)(4); Neb.
§ 60-617; N.J. § 6b; N.Y. §§ 302(6), 402(3); N.D. § 2(5); Ohio § 1317.02; Ore. § 5;
Pa. § 614 B 4. (For full citation see notes 2 and 3 supra.) But see text, supra note 50.
66 Rate filing: Fla. § 520.07(c); Ill. § 227; Iowa § 322.3(6)(d); Kan. § 7(g); Ky.
§ 190.100(4); Me. § 254 III; Md. § 119; Miss. § 26(c); N.Y. §§ 302(6), 402(5); N.D.
§ 2(6); Ore. § 6(1); (special provisions governing credit life, health, and accident insur-
ance § 6(2)); S.D. § 3(6). Manual: Ind. § 58-905; Ohio § 1317.05 (buyer permitted to
deduct three times the amount of any excessive charge). Two states set the maximum
charge in terms of the market price for similar coverage. Michi § 492.116; Pa. § 617.
(For full citation see notes 2 and 3 supra.)
67 Fla. § 520.07(c); Il1. § 227; Iowa added § 2; Kan. § 7(g); Ky. § 190.100(4); Me.
§ 254111; Mass. see G.L. c. 175, § 193E; Mich. § 492.116; Minn. § 6c; Miss. § 26(c);
N.Y. § 302(6); cf. N.Y. § 402; N.D. § 2(6); Ore. § 6(3); Pa. § 617; S.D. § 3(7); Va.
§ 46-536. Some states have anti-coercion provisions apart from instalment sales acts,
e.g., Neb. 1957, L.B. No. 458, 1 CCH Cond. Chat. Mortg. Rep. 9359. Others attack the
problem by regulation as well, e.g., Connecticut, Regulations of the Insurance Commis-
sioner § 292-2-9, 1 CCH Cond. Sale Chat. Mortg. Rep. § 917 (Conn. Statutes). (For
full citation see notes 2 and 3 supra.)
68 Nebraska provides that the disapproval of the insurer selected by the buyer (1) must
be reasonable under all the circumstances; (2) cannot be arbitrary .or unreasonably dis-
criminatory; and (3) does not tend to unreasonably restrain trade or to create a
monopoly. Neb. L. 1957, L.B. No. 458, 1 CCHI Cond. Sale Chat. Mortg. Rep. 9359.
Kansas has a similar provision. Kan. L. 1958, H.B. 25-x, 7(g); 1 CCH Cond. Sale Chat.
Mortg. Rep. 6126 ff 7(g).
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implied in this slogan is no doubt real, but it should not cloud the fact
that this type of insurance also reduces the creditor's risk.69
The abuses here are not unlike those related to insurance on the
property itself. They have been summed up by Florida's Insurance
Commissioner as (1) excessive insurance (for example, requiring a five
hundred dollar policy on a fifty dollar deal); (2) pyramiding coverage
(failing to cancel old insurance and requiring new insurance when the
debt is refinanced); (3) overcharging; (4) coercion; and (5) nonpay-
ment of claims.7"
Overcharging in this field is perhaps typified by the cases in which the
buyer is charged the single policy rate, and the seller or financing agency
carries group credit life, health, and accident insurance. One estimate of
the overcharge in such cases indicates that the buyer pays twice the cost
of the insurance.71 Oregon specifically attacks this practice by limiting
the amount of the insurance premiums for credit life, health, and acci-
dent insurance to the actual cost to the financing agency or dealer. 2
The tied-in insurance company appears to be a case of indirect over-
charging. Although the buyer pays the usual rate in such cases, the
financing agency ultimately reaps the profit from the insurance.73 There
is little likelihood of enactment of regulatory legislation governing the
tied-in companies only.74 Furthermore, since this form of insurance is
employed in all kinds of loan transactions, its entire regulation might
better be left to general insurance law. Florida enacted such legislation
in 1956, and the National Association of Insurance Commissioners
has suggested a model act.75
D. "Balloon Notes" and "Add On Contracts." Some abuses cannot
69 Morris, "History of Credit Life Insurance," 1957 Ins. L.J. 329, emphasizes the debtor
benefits. In 1956 families of debtors are reported to have received $77 million in payment
of claims under group credit life insurance policies. Downey, "Insurance in Installment
Credit Transactions," 1958 Ins. L.J. 256, 263.
70 Statement of J. Edwin Larsen, also Chairman of the Subcommittee of the National
Association of Insurance Commissioners on Credit Life, Health & Accident Insurance,
1957 Ins. L.J. 327.
71 "Thus on a comparable basis, the rate for ordinary consumer credit life insurance is
about twice that of group coverage." Kedzie, "Present Characteristics & Trends, Credit
Life Insurance," 1957 Ins. L.J. 334, 338.
72 Note 66 supra.
73 From 1950-1956, Motor Insurance Corp., owned by G.M.A.C. had average yearly
earnings of nearly three million dollars. Moody's Bank & Financial Manual 841 (1957).
The Wisconsin court held that the amount of G.MA.C. dealer participation included
retained insurance premiums from transactions with Motor Insurance Corp. so that the total
could not exceed two per cent limit. General Motors A. Corp. v. Commissioner of Banks,
258 Wis. 56, 45 N.W.2d 83 (1950), rehearing denied, 258 Wis. 64a, 46 N.W.2d 328 (1951).
74 None of the present legislation directly deals with the problem. In 1957 new legis-
lation in Massachusetts appears to have been defeated because of debate on an amend-
ment covering the problem of tied-in insurance companies. The original bill is contained
in Mass. House Document No. 2825 (1957).
75 Report, National Association of Insurance Commissioners, June 1954. For the text,
see, 1957 Ins. L.J. 376; Fla. Stat. Ann. §§ 646.01-08 (1956).
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be eliminated by disclosure alone. They relate to the terms of the
contract itself and are tools for overreaching by the seller. One of these
is the "balloon note". By this device the contract or note calls for rela-
tively small regular payments and a final large payment.78 Variations
on the theme are endless and may be in the time allocations of the instal-
ments as well as in the amount. The danger perceived by legislators is
that such terms leave the buyer in an extremely hazardous position at
the time of the last payment. He is at the mercy of the finance com-
pany, which may decide to foreclose its security interest or extend the
terms of payment.
Legislative treatment of these provisions has not been at all uniform.
Limitation rather than prohibition is more appropriate because this
kind of repayment plan appears to have a legitimate function in those
cases where the buyer's income is seasonal.77 Maryland's provisions are
the most ambitious, and such clauses are there prohibited unless the
buyer is given an absolute right to have the schedule of payments re-
vised to conform to average amounts and intervals. 78 New York relies
totally upon a requirement of conspicuous disclosure of the term.79 Many
of the statutes are simply silent on the question.
80
A similar use of the eager or ignorant buyer's willingness to sign forms
gives birth to the "add on" provision. .Here the seller attempts to en-
hance his in rem security position by providing either (1) that future
instalment purchases will also secure the first contract, or (2) that
the subject matter of the present sale also secures past sales obligations.
Thus, though the buyer may have made payments sufficient to pay for
the goods purchased under one contract, he discovers that default in
another contract may result in the holder seizing both items.
Considerable doubt is cast on both kinds of clauses when a condi-
tional sales device is used to finance the sale.81 Even where a chattel
mortgage is employed, the attempt to include after-acquired property
76 An estimated seven per cent of the new automobile contracts in 1955 contained
balloon payment terms; one eighth of these were to buyers associated with the automo-
tive industry. 1957 F.R.B. Study, pp. 52-3, supra note 48.
77 Prohibition with exceptions in the case of seasonal workers and/or automobile sales-
men; Mich. Comp. Laws § 492.112(f) (Supp. 1956); see also § 492.122; Pa. Stat. Ann.
tit. 69, § 613F (Supp. 1956). Limitation: Md. Ann. Code art. 83, § 118c (Supp. 1951).
78 Md. Ann. Code art. 83, § 118c (Supp. 1951).
79 N.Y. Pers. Prop. Law § 402(3).
80 Some of the legislation inferentially approves the balloon notes by spelling out a
method of allocating the finance charge in case of irregular payments, e.g., Fla. Stat. Ann.
§ 520.08 (Supp. No. 6 1957); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. c. 59 § 255II (Supp. 1957); Ore.
Laws 1957, c. 625 § 21.
81 Compare Bucyrus-Erie Co. v. Casey, 61 F.2d 473 (3d Cir. 1932), with Webster Hall
Corp. v. Continental Bank, 66 F.2d 558 (3d Cir. 1933). See also Dunn v. Archer, 150
Tenn. 440, 265 S.W. 678 (1924).
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may fall at the suit of creditors."2 But neither of these considerations
help the consumer, since we are still confronted with their in terrorem
effect and their use in cases where the buyer fails to resist. 3 On the
other hand, some valid basis for their use may be present when the
seller needs the added security to adequately protect himself as in the
case of rapidly deteriorating goods. If authorized, care must be taken
that the "add on" provision is not used to avoid the disclosure require-
ments of the act. This is particularly true of the provision which picks
up after-acquired property. Maryland provides that in this event the
disclosure obligation must be met at the time of the second purchase, and
payments made thereafter are statutorily allocated to each purchase.
When either price is paid, that property becomes the buyer's.8 4
IV. PROTECTION AFFORDED DURING THE CREDIT EXTENSION
Close on the heels of the execution of the instalment contract by the
buyer, the seller assigns the paper to the financing institution. Some of
the rights of the buyer now hinge on general contract law. There is the
traditional question of whether or not the buyer will be protected as
against the finance company if, without notice of the assignment, he
pays the seller. In those circumstances case law usually safeguards the
buyer, and some of the statutes codify that result. 5
A. Acceleration Provisions. One risk the buyer takes in some tran-
sactions is the acceleration of the obligation. Where this is based on
default in payment, little objection can be made to the seller's refusal
to wait for each payment to fall in default. But many times the ac-
celeration does not hinge upon default or any other ascertainable fact but
upon whether or not the seller deems himself to be insecure. This
licenses considerable discretion in the finance company.
Courts have reacted to this kind of provision in at least three ways:
(1) the creditor is the sole judge of the facts, and so long as he acts in
82 Cohen & Gerber, "The After-Acquired Property Clause," 87 U. Pa. L. Rev. 635
(1939). The Commercial Code gives vitality to such clauses generally, but limits their
effect in consumer goods transactions to goods acquired within ten days after the ad-
vance. U.C.C. 9-204 (1957 ed.).
83 "Add ons" are dealt with in: Conn. § 6699(a) (2); Ill. § 237; Ky. § 190.100(1) (b);
Md. § 124; Mass. § 13B (household furniture only); N.J. § 6(a)(2); N.Y. § 302(17);
and N.D. § 2(17). (For full citation see notes 2 and 3 supra.)
84 Md. Ann. Code art. 83, § 124 (1951).
85 4 Corbin, Contracts § 890 (1951); 2 Williston, Contracts § 433 (1936); Colo.
§ 13-16-6(1)(e); Conn. § 6699(a)(5); Fla. § 520.08(d); Ill. § 231; Kan. § 8(d); Ky.
§ 190.100(1) (e); Me. 255 IV; Md. § 123; Mich. § 492.115; Minn. § 6a(4) ; Miss. § 27(d) ;
N.J. § 6a(5); N.Y. §§ 302(11), 406; N.D. § 2(11); Ore. § 11; Pa. § 616; S.D. § 3(3);
Wis. § 6e. Of these, Colo. § 13-16-6(4); Conn. § 6699(e); Fla. § 520.08(d); Kan. § 8(d);
Ky. § 190.100(s); Me. § 255 IV; Minn. § 6d; N.J. § 6d; Miss. § 27(d); N.D. § 2(10);
N.Y. §§ 302(10), 411; SMD. § 3(8); Ore. § 10, provide protection to the finance com-
pany as assignee of the contract against some of the risks of the assignor's insolvency or
bankruptcy. (For full citation see notes 2 and 3 supra.)
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good faith there is no requirement that he must have reasonable grounds
for deeming himself insecure;8 6 (2) the acceleration can only occur
where the creditor had good reason to think and did in good faith think
himself insecure; 7 and (3) the creditor must act in good faith and
upon facts which actually render the debt insecure. s Some suggestion
has been made of a fourth solution, permitting even arbitrary accelera-
tion where the creditor does not actually consider himself to be in-
secure.
89
The Uniform Commercial Code adopts the first view and provides
that such an acceleration provision means that the accelerating party
shall have the power to do so only if he in good faith believes that the
prospect of payment or performance is impaired.90 The party objecting
to the acceleration must sustain the burden of establishing lack of good
faith, which is elsewhere defined as "honesty in fact."9' This, however,
is not directed particularly at consumer sales but at commercial transac-
tions in general, and a more stringent provision in the area under discus-
sion would certainly be compatible with the Code. 2 The instalment
sales statutes frequently prohibit the operation of such clauses, particu-
larly where the acceleration is arbitrary or without reasonable cause 3
An astute seller, intent on overreaching, might succeed by taking a series
of demand notes from an unwary buyer; but this advantage would seldom
be worth the added administrative cost and burden.9 4
When acceleration is permitted, one of its side effects is to create a
problem as to the apportionment of the finance charge. Since the finance
charge is lumped together with the cash price and other fees, and this
total is then divided into the instalments, there is no real contractual
86 E.g., Thorp v. Fleming, 78 Kan. 237, 96 Pac. 470 (1908); Johnson v. Thayer, 53
Ohio App. 25, 4 N.E.2d 172 (1936); Cline v. Libby, 46 Wis. 123, 49 N.W. 832 (1879).
87 E.g., Bullock v. Young, 118 A.2d 917 (D.C. Mun. Ct. App. 1955); Parks v. Phillips,
71 Nev. 313, 289 P.2d 1053 (1955); Woodruff v. Stahl, 126 Wash. 184, 217 Pac. 1013
(1923).
88 Flinn v. Fredrickson, 89 Neb. 563, 131 N.W. 934 (1911); Humpfner v. D. M. Os-
borne & Co., 2 S.D. 310, 50 N.W. 88 (1891).
89 2 Jones, Chattel Mortgages and Conditional Sales § 431b (Bowers ed. 1933). On
the effect of such clauses upon the negotiability of the instrument, see Chafee, "Accelera-
tion Provisions in Time Paper," 32 Harv. L. Rev. 747 (1919); Note, 101 U. Pa. L.
Rev. 835 (1953).
90 U.C.C. 1-208 (1957 ed.).
91 Ibid.
92 Although the rule dealing with such an acceleration is contained in article 1, General
Provisions, which also sets out a presumption against implied repeal (§ 1-104), the fre-
quent saving clauses in article 2, Sales, and article 9, Secured Transactions, clearly indi-
cate that a different rule in regulatory legislation would be controlling. U.C.C. 2-102,
nn. 9-102, 9-203(2) (1957 ed.).
93 Ill. § 233; Md. § 118d; Mich. § 492.114(b); N.Y. §§ 302(13), 403(3); NJ).§ 2(13); Ore. § 13; Pa. § 615 (approved where car is being illegally used). (For full
citation see notes 2 and 3 supra.) Of these, only Maryland, Michigan and Pennsylvania
contain outright prohibition.
94 Comment U.C.C. 1-208 (1952 ed.).
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allocation of the charge to any time interval. In the parallel situation
where the obligation is voluntarily paid before maturity, the buyer may
be denied a reduction in the finance charge for the interval between
payment and the stated maturity date.
B. Prepayment Rights. Only an exaggerated emphasis upon the
notion that the seller is entitled to his original bargain can lead to a
denial of some proportionate rebate to the buyer under the circum-
stance of voluntary prepayment. The statutory solutions are aimed mainly
at voluntary prepayment, but New York recently amended its laws to
provide for credit for full payment made prior to the maturity of the
final instalment even where acceleration occurs because of the buyer's
default. 5 Some utilize the so-called "rule of 78" or the "sum of the
digits" method. 6 Others use a general allocation based on the sum of
payments made. 7 In either test some weight has been given to the
contention that upon the advance payment the finance company is also
entitled to an "acquisition cost."
'98
The "rule of 78" or the "sum of the digits" method allocates the
finance charge upon the notion that the financing agency earns the
greater part of the charge in the early period of the credit extension.
This seems to be true, since the amount of the principal is steadily re-
duced as payments are made. The nomenclature comes from the fact that
the sum of the digits one through twelve (the number of months in the
year) totals seventy-eight. This total number is used as the denominator
of the fraction applied to the finance charge to determine the rebate.
The numerator of that fraction is obtained by adding the sum of the
digits assigned to the months anticipated. In making this assignment,
the first month of the credit extension is given the number twelve, the
second eleven, and so forth, because of the notion that most of the charge
is earned in the early months. To particularize this formula, let us as-
sume that we have a twelve-month contract with instalments set at
$90 a month; the finance charge at $80. If paid in full after the sixth
month, the "rule of 78" would use twenty-one (the sum of 6, 5, 4, 3, 2, 1)
as the numerator of the fraction, and the formula would be as follows:
95 N.Y. Pers. Prop. Law §§ 305, 408.
96 Indiana § 58-906, Rebate set by the Department of Financial Institutions, General
Order No. 1, April 25, 1949; 2 CCH Cond. Sale Chat. Mortg. Rep. § 914.01 (Indiana);
Md. § 125; Mass. § 12 B. (For full citation see notes 2 and 3 supra.)
97 Cal. § 2982c; Colo. § 13-16-7; Conn. § 6701(a); Fla. § 520.09; Ill. § 242; Iowa
3223(6)(3); Kan. § 9 (proportion of sum of monthly balances beginning one month
after prepayment and the sum of all monthly balances); Ky. § 190.120; Me. § 256; Minn.
§ 8; Miss. § 28; Nev. § 97.050; N.J. § 7; N.Y. §§ 305, 408; N.D. § 5; Ore. § 24; Pa.
§ 622; S.D. § 5; Utah § 15-1 to -2a (70% of amount). (For full citation see notes
2 and 3 supra.)
98 See note 100 infra.
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21- $80 = Rebate $21.50"9
78
The alternate formula merely ascertains the rebate by applying to
the finance charge a fraction made up of the sum of the payments an-
ticipated over the sum of all the payments under the contract. Thus, in
our hypothetical case, the rebate would be calculated as follows:
540
X $80 = $40
1080
You will note that this does not take into account the factor of early
risk as does the "rule of 78." For that reason it seems less realistic.
That factor may, however, be considered through the means of an ac-
quisition cost or a minimum finance charge. The New York motor
vehicle act specifically permits a seller to deduct and retain fifteen dollars
of the credit service charge prior to the application of the fraction.' 0
This acquisition cost would result in the refund in our hypothetical case
being altered to $32.50.101 If the acquisition cost is calculated so that
it compensates the financing agency for more than mere administrative
charges, then it is a means of avoiding the objection raised to the sum
of the balances formula.
C. Receipts, Statements of Account, Evidence of Cancellation.
Other general protections afforded the buyer during the credit extension
include the right to a receipt for a "cash" payment." s With the huge
increase of personal checking accounts, some problems of interpretation
of "cash" may be expected.' In addition, the buyer upon written de-
mand is entitled to a statement of indebtedness and a statement of can-
99 The confusion attendant upon an ambiguous definition of the month of payment is
examined in Note, 2 Stan. L. Rev. 362, 364 (1950).
100 The holder is entitled to an acquisition cost or minimum finance charge in: Cali-
fornia ($25.00); Colorado ($15.00); Connecticut ($15.00); Florida ($25.00); Illinois
($10.00); Iowa ($25.00); Kentucky ($25.00); Maine ($25.00); Minnesota ($15.00);
Mississippi ($10.00); Nevada ($25.00); New Jersey ($10.00); New York ($10.00-$15.00);
North Dakota ($15.00); Oregon ($15.00); Pennsylvania ($10.00); South Dakota ($15.00);
Utah ($5.00 and $15.00 for motor vehicles). Usually there is no requirement of a refund
where the amount due is less than one dollar.
101 The formula would then be:
540
- x ($80-$15) = $32.50
1080
102 Cash payments only: Colo. § 13-16-6(1) (e); Conn. § 6699(a) (6); Fla. § 520.07(g);
Ill. § 232; Kan. § 7(m); Ky. § 190.100(1) (f) ; Me. § 254 VII; Minn. § 6a(5); Miss. § 26(h);
N.J. § 6a(6); N.Y. §§ 302(12), 407; N.D. § 2(12); S.D. § 3(4). All payments: Md.
§ 123; Mich. § 492.129; Ore. § 12; Pa. § 629. (For full citation see notes 2 and 3 supra.)
103 The difficulty is anticipated by reason of those cases holding a check to be condi-
tional payment of the debt, e.g., Wasilauskas v. Brookline Savings Bank, 259 Mass. 215,
156 N.E. 34 (1927) (involving the construction of by-law as to "money paid out"); Pohl
v. Johnson, 179 Minn. 398, 229 N.W. 555 (1930).
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cellation sufficient to release the security. 0 4 The requirement of a de-
mand for the statement of cancellation may be unwise unless the buyer
is informed of the right to obtain the release. 0 5 Furthermore, where a
recording of the original security interest has been made, it seems wise
to add a duty upon the financing agency to record the release and thus
insulate the buyer from impairment of his credit status because of the
earlier recording of the security device. 6 The financing agency's burden
would not be intolerable in those cases where it elected to record the
documents, since it already would be dealing with the recording office on
a regular basis.
V. PROTECTION UPON DEFAULT
The duality of the practical functioning of the instalment contract
is nowhere more apparent than in the provisions governing default. It
is not merely a little piece of legislation to be construed in litigation.
It is perhaps more important as a weapon in what frequently becomes
a war of nerves. Threats are almost always less expensive to the creditor
than litigation. One textbook for retail credit employees suggests that in
dealing with obstinate debtors, one advantage of utilizing credit collec-
tion agencies and attorneys is that "fear is inspired on the part of most
debtors who do not know what the collection agency or attorney may,
or can, do to them."0 T This tool is obviously enhanced if the collector
can point to a particularly harsh provision of the contract when he
actually makes a threat.' The enforceability of such clauses then is
immaterial for these purposes.
A. Delinquency and Penalty Provisions. Delinquency and penalty
provisions often fall in this in terrorem category. Here the debtor is, by
reason of a contract stipulation, required to pay additional sums when he
104 Statement of Indebtedness: Colo. § 13-16-6(1) (e) ; Conn. § 6699(a) (6) ; Fla.
§ 502.079; I1. § 232; Kan. § 7(m); Ky. § 190.100(1)(f); Me. § 254 VII; Md. § 130; Mich.
§ 492.128; Minn. § 6a(5); Miss. § 26(h); N.J. § 6a(6); N.Y. §§ 302(12), 407; N.D.
§ 2(12); Ore. § 12; Pa. § 628; S.D. § 3(4). Statement of Cancellation: Conn. § 6699(h)
(contracts over $100); Ill. § 241; Kan. § 7(m); Md. § 127; Mich. § 492.130; N.Y. §§ 304,
412; N.D. § 4; Ore. § 23; Pa. § 630. (For full citation see notes 2 and 3 supra.)
105 Of the statutes cited in note 104 supra, Connecticut, Illinois, North Dakota and
Pennsylvania place a mandatory obligation upon the finance company to mail a sufficient
release of the debt to the buyer.
106 During the Massachusetts legislative deliberations upon the Uniform Commercial
Code in the fall of 1957, the writer and others met with a group of town, city, and state
officials responsible for recording in Massachusetts, and these officials emphasized that
their experience demonstrated the need for the mandatory recording of statements of can-
cellation.
107 Phelps, Retail Credit Fundamentals 337 (1957).
108 In Lepore v. Atlantic Corporation, - Mass. -, 148 N.E.2d 279 (1958), the court
ignored this consideration in upholding the validity of a conditional sales contract which con-
tained the statutory clause on expenses in repossession and resale and another inconsistent
provision authorizing 15% of the unpaid debt as attorney's fees on the basis that the
statutory clause started out with a proviso "Anything herein contained to the contrary
notwithstanding ... ." Cf. note 139 infra.
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fails to make a payment on time. This added charge not only induces
the debtor to pay on time, but it also compensates the financing institu-
tion for any extra cost incurred by reason of the special treatment re-
quired under the particular contract.
On the other hand, this area is ripe for rate abuses, since a dispro-
portionate penalty inflicted shortly after nonpayment can be a source of
extra income to the financing firm. Hence there may be a reverse twist
to the penalty. It may encourage the debtor to pay, but it may also dis-
courage efforts at prompt collection by the holder of the contract. 10 9
In this circumstance we are close to the finance company making a new
"loan" at what may be an exorbitant rate, that is, the delinquency
charge. This runs counter to the basis of the regulatory legislation, the
usury laws, and much of the small loan legislation restricting regular
lenders." 0 Two tools, alone or in combination, are employed as remedies.
One is the prohibition of delinquency charges during a short five or ten
day grace period."' The other is the control of the amount of any de-
linquency charge. Usually the provisions set a maximum of five per cent
of the amount in default or five dollars, whichever is the lesser amount." 2
B. Refinancing. If the delinquency continues, the financing firm
is faced ultimately with refinancing the obligation or employing its legal
weapons against the debtor."3 If the refinancing technique comes into
play, other police power controls may operate on the transaction. The
general usury laws of some jurisdictions have been held to apply, since
this extension has much the same effect as a cash loan." 4 If the amount
involved is within the statutory limits, the various small loan or con-
sumer finance laws may control.",5 Generally they permit a higher in-
109 Donaldson, "An Analysis of Retail Installment Sales Legislation," 19 Rocky Mt.
L. Rev. 135, 153 (1947).
110 Late charges were held usurious in Duvio v. Thomas, 95 So. 2d 687 (La. App. 1957).
111 Colo. § 13-16-6(1) (c); Conn. § 6699(a) (4); Fla. § 520.07e; Ill. § 228; Kan. § 7(k);
Ky. § 190.100(1)(d); Me. § 254; Md. § 132; Mass. § 13D; Minn. § 6a(3); Miss.
§ 26(e); NJ. § 6a(4); N.Y. §§ 302(7), 402(6); ND. § 2(7); Ohio § 1317.06; Ore. § 7;
S.D. § 2(7). (For full citation see notes 2 and 3 supra.)
112 Colo. § 13-16-6(1) (c); Conn. § 6699(a) (4); Fla. § 520.07e; Ill. § 228; Ind. § 58-906
(set by Department); Kan. § 7(k) (5% or $2.50); Ky. § 190.100(1)(d); Me. § 254 (5%
each instalment or 6% per annum on the total unpaid balance); Md. § 132; Mich.
§ 492.120 (2% a month; not authorized on accelerated paper); Minn. § 6a(3); Miss.
§ 26(e); NJ. § 6a(4); N.Y. §§ 302(7), 402(6); N.D. § 2(7); Ohio § 1317.06 (5 cents
on the dollar); Ore. § 7; Pa. § 621 (2% a month); S.D. § 2(7). (For full citation see
notes 2 and 3 supra.) All of these except Indiana, Kansas, Michigan, Ohio, and Penn-
sylvania also authorize the collection of limited attorneys' fees as long as the contract is
referred to an attorney who is not a salaried employee of the holder.
113 By the middle of 1956, approximately eight per cent of the 1954 and four per cent
of the 1955 new car instalment buyers had refinanced their purchases. 1957 F.R.B. Study,
p. 82, supra note 48.
114 Associates Discount Corp. v. Ruddock, 224 Miss. 533, 81 So. 2d 249 (1955) ; London
v. Toney, 263 N.Y. 439, 189 N.E. 485 (1934), 91 A.L.R. 1100 (1934).
115 Such a result seems to have been reached in State ex rel. Beck v. Associates Dis-
count Corp., 162 Neb. 683, 715, 77 N.W.2d 215, 233 (1956).
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terest rate than the usury laws but only to licensed regulated lenders, n 6
Here too the problem of allocating the unearned portion of the finance
and insurance charges must be considered by any thoughtful draftsman..
All but one of the retail instalment sales acts establishing control of the
refinancing rates also set the original rate." 7
C. Repossession and Resale. Failing collection or refinancing, the
financial institution then considers the more drastic method of collection
-realization upon the security. This is ordinarily accomplished by re-
possession and resale of the property involved."' A myriad of laws
apply to this part of the activity. Since few states actually control
security realization in the instalment sales legislation itself, the emphasis
here will be placed upon the provisions of the Uniform Conditional Sales
Act and the Uniform Commercial Code.119
Where protection is afforded the consumer, it is formulated on the
premises of (1) safeguarding the act of repossession in order to prevent
any breach of the peace; (2) permitting the buyer to pay the debt and
thus redeem the property taken by the seller; (3) as far as practicable,
assuring that the resale is so effectively conducted as to avoid unneces-
sary loss to the buyer and thus reduce or eliminate any deficiency
judgment; and (4) requiring the seller to account to the buyer for any
profit made on the resale over and above the amount of the debt and
expenses.
Repossession limitations in the instalment sales acts have followed
the provisions of the Uniform Conditional Sales Act, demanding re-
116 Hubachek, "The Development of Regulatory Small Loan Laws," 8 Law & Contemp.
Prob. 108, 115 (1941).
11" Conn. § 6702; Fla. § 520.10; Iowa added § 4; Kan. § 10; Ky. § 190.130; Me. § 257;
Mich. § 492.119; Minn. § 9; Miss. § 29; N.J. § 8; N.Y. §§ 306, 409; N.D. § 6; Ore. § 25;
Pa. § 620; S.D. § 6. (For full citation see notes 2 and 3 supra.) Of these only New Jersey
fails to set a maximum original rate, see supra note 54.
118 One estimite indicates that from one to two per cent of the new cars sold on the
instalment plan in 1954-1955 had been repossessed by the middle of 1956. 1957 F.R.B.
Study, p. 81, supra note 48. An interesting study of four hundred and three personal
bankruptcy cases in Kansas City and St. Louis, Missouri, shows that defaults may be due
to poor planning by the lender as well as the borrower. "Consumer finance companies had
unpaid debts in 70 per cent of the cases (St. Louis) compared with 69 per cent for the
bankruptcy group in Kansas City and 79 per cent for the wage earner plan group. Sales
finance companies were involved in 46 per cent of the cases (St. Louis), well above the
36 per cent and 24 per cent for the bankruptcy group and wage earner plan group in
Kansas City. Banks were owed money in 31 per cent of the cases (St. Louis), below the
36 per cent for the bankruptcy group in Kansas City, but well above the 10 per cent
for the wage earner plan group." Dauten, C., Overloading the Borrower and Bankruptcy
-Cause and Effect, Proceedings of the Fourth Annual Consumer Credit Conference 1957,
Washington University School of Business, St. Louis, p. 16, 25.
119 Retail instalment sales acts detailing control over security realization include those
in Connecticut, Florida, Illinois, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, and Pennsylvania.
(For full citation see notes 2 and 3 supra.) The failure of the American legislatures to
provide safeguards upon repossession has been well said to be its great point of weak-
ness. Donovan, "Retail Instalment Sales-The Australian Experience," 33 N.Y.U.L. Rev.
666, 690 (1958).
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taking by legal process only where a breach of the peace would other-
wise occur. 2" This adds little to the buyer's protection. If abuses are
prevalent in connection with repossessions, the English Hire-Purchase
Act offers an excellent tool aimed at what is picturesquely described as
the "snatch back."'' Under sections 11 and 12 of the Act, if one third
of the price has been paid, the owner (who holds a comparable position
to that of the secured party under American law) may enforce the
contract only by legal action. The court has the power to make orders
protecting the goods from damage or depreciation pending the hearing.
Although such judicial control of repossession would prevent many of
the abuses and much of the tort litigation in this area, none of the
American statutes go this far. 2
A few of the statutes require preliminary notice to the buyer of the
intention to retake in order that the buyer can arrange for payment or
prepare for the loss of the goods. 2 It has been suggested that such a
notice is desirable to avoid the summary seizure of the baby's crib or
the family washer, despite its admitted utility to the buyer intent upon
absconding or concealing the goods.'24 Wedded to complete judicial
control, this notice provision would be unexceptionable; but alone it
offers considerable basis for the worries of those lenders who cannot deny
abuses in their industry but who have vivid and unhappy memories of
recalcitrant, fraudulent, and generally dishonest buyers. This is par-
ticularly true when one recollects that the usual practice of collection
involves many notices of the default on the indebtedness prior to seizure
of the goods.'25 Furthermore, the statutory period of time allowed the
buyer to redeem the goods after repossession should be long enough to
enable him to arrange to pay the debt, so that in any event he would
be deprived of the goods for only a relatively short time.
As to redemption rights of the buyer, the parallel to the Uniform Con-
ditional Sales Act is again significant. It is here that the principal defect
relating to consumer protection in the Uniform Act is apparent, since
the holder of a conditional sales contract is able to cut off the buyer's
power to redeem by a notice prior to retaking.126 The theory seems
120 Unif. Cond. Sales Act. § 16. See also Conn. § 6700(a); Fla. § 520.11; Mass. § 13 E;
Md. § 128; Mich. § 492.123(a); N.D. § 2(15); Ore. § 15; Pa. § 623; U.C.C. 9-503
(1957 ed.).
121 Abrahams G., The Law Relating to Hire-Purchase 77 (1938).
122 The numerous tort cases in repossession are collected in 146 A.L.R. 1331 (1943);
105 A.L.R. 926 (1936); 57 A.L.R. 26 (1928). See also Note, 53 Mich. L. Rev. 1016
(1955).
123 Md. Ann. Code art. 83, §§ 128, 129 (Supp. 1957); Mich. Comp. Laws § 492.123(d)
(Supp. 1956).
124 Donaldson, supra note 109, at 157.
125 Phelps, op. cit. supra note 107, at 317.
126 Unif. Cond. Sales Act §§ 17, 18. Similar power is vested in the mortgagee in Corn.
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to be that the buyer's interest is thus protected, since he can pay the
amount due during the period between the notice and the actual retaking.
This may be true of the informed commercial merchant-buyer, but the
existence of the retail instalment sales legislation is bottomed upon
disclosure to a group of buyers who are not informed of their rights.
Moreover, if the buyer pays even after retaking, the seller cannot legiti-
mately complain, because payment of the debt is the whole reason for
the security interest. The notice of redemption in the Uniform Condi-
tional Sales Act was borrowed from the rights of the mortgagee under
a chattel mortgage, so that where that device is employed, the buyer's
power to redeem is more secure.127 It is especially noteworthy here
that the Uniform Commercial Code abolishes the distinctions between
chattel mortgages and conditional sales and also rejects the Uniform
Conditional Sales Act's limitation upon the buyer's right of redemption. 28
If the buyer refuses to or cannot ransom the goods through redemp-
tion, his principal hazard then becomes the deficiency judgment. Of the
various avenues open to protecting him from an exorbitant deficiency
judgment, the forced resale is the one generally chosen. This too has a
Uniform Conditional Sales Act antecedent. 2 9 First, in certain circum-
stances the seller is forced to make a resale where the buyer has paid
fifty per cent or more of the price or, if less has been paid, where the
buyer makes a written demand for a resale.' Secondly, the buyer is dis-
charged from liability for any deficiency if no resale is made.' 3'
The Uniform Commercial Code has parallel provisions in both in-
stances. Under section 9-505(1) if sixty per cent of the price has been
paid in a purchase-money consumer-goods transaction, the buyer is pro-
tected by requiring a sale. The Code requires this resale unless the buyer
renounces or modifies his right to such a sale after default.13 This is
unlike the provisions of the Maryland Retail Instalment Sales Act which
Gen. Stat. § 6700(b) (Supp. 1955); 111. Ann. Stat. c. 121 3/2, § 245 (Smith-Hurd, Supp.
No. 3, 1957).
127 Contractual attempts to authorize private foreclosure of chattel mortgages were
successful, but judicial control of the fairness of the resale price persisted. Gilmore and
Axelrod, "Chattel Security," 57 Yale L.J. 517, 533 (1948).
128 Comments, U.C.C. 9-101 (1952 ed.); U.C.C. 9-507 (1957 ed.).
-2 Unif. Cond. Sales Act § 19.
130 Unif. Cond. Sales Act §§ 19, 20; Conn. § 6700(d)-(e); Fla. § 520.11(a); Ill. § 247
(not compulsory); Md. § 130; Mass. § 13F (only where fifty per cent paid); Mich.
§ 492.127 (not compulsory); Pa. § 626 (not compulsory). Ill. § 249 and Mich. § 492.127
attempt to protect a buyer who has paid in 80% of a time balance of $2,000 or less by
requiring a seller who repossessed without legal process to elect between losing the de-
ficiency or returning the vehicle and suing for the balance due. (For full citation see notes
2 and 3 supra.)
181 Unif. Cond. Sales Act § 23; Conn. § 6700(h); Fla. § 520.11(c); In. § 247; Md.
§ 131. (For full citation see notes 2 and 3 supra.)
182 U.C.C. 9-505(1) (1957 ed.).
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require the resale only upon the buyer's demand.133 The Code provi-
sions seems preferable, for they retain a desirable flexibility while protect-
ing the buyer from losing his right to a resale through ignorance of the
necessity for a demand. Under section 9-505 (2) even where less than
sixty per cent of the price has been paid, the seller can only retain the
goods without a resale where he does so in full satisfaction of the
buyer's obligation after giving the buyer notice and an opportunity dur-
ing a thirty-day period to demand a resale. 134
The remaining issue concerns the kind of resale to be required: should
it be public or private. As to the forced sale the Uniform Conditional
Sales Act requires a public resale.'35 The Code permits a private resale
as long as it is commercially reasonable in every aspect including method,
manner, time, place, and terms.1386 Furthermore, unless the goods are
perishable or are the kind sold on a recognized market, the Code de-
mands that the debtor be notified of the time of sale.3 7 The Code does
prohibit the secured party from buying at a public sale but recognizes
his right to buy at a private sale. 8
Finally, there is the question of the seller's duty to pay to the buyer
the portion of the proceeds of the sale which exceed the amount of the
debt and the expenses of repossession and resale. Incidental to that
issue there is a problem of defining the legitimate expenses involved.13 9
133 Md. Ann. Code art. 83, § 130 (Supp. 1957). (Buyer must also deposit 10% of the
amount due at repossession.) A demand is also required by Mass. Ann. Laws c. 255,
§ 13F (Supp. 1956).
134 The requirement of an objection to a proposed retention of repossessed goods in
satisfaction of the debt is consistent with the argument for no demand in the case of a
compulsory resale. By lodging the choice in the buyer, he is given the power of exer-
cising judgment as to the most profitable approach: resale with liability for a deficiency
or no resale with no such liability. U.C.C. 9-505 (1957 ed.).
135 Unif. Cond. Sales Act. § 19. Public or private: Conn. § 6700(d); Fla. § 520.11(a);
11. § 247; Pa. § 626. Public: Mass. § 13F; Mich. § 492.126; Md. § 130. (For full
citation see notes 2 and 3 supra.)
136 U.C.C. 9-504(3). See also U.C.C. 9-507(2).
137 U.C.C. 9-504(3).
138 U.C.C. 9-504(3). Similarly, Conn. Gen. Stat. § 6700(d) (Supp. 1955).
139 Compare Unif. Cond. Sales Act § 21 with U.C.C. 9-504(1). Massachusetts has had
considerable appellate litigation under a statute requiring a contract term allowing the
deduction of the "reasonable expenses of such repossession and sale." Lepore v. Atlantic
Corporation, - Mass. -, 148 N.E.2d 279 (1958) (express provision for 15% of amount due
as attorney's fees; seller did not lose security because statutory clause included and
prefaced by, "Anything herein contained to the contrary notwithstanding . . ."); National
Cash Register Co. v. Warner, 335 Mass. 736, 142 N.E.2d 584 (1957) ("reasonable expenses of
repossession and resale, including reasonable attorney's fees"; seller did not lose security);
Clark & White Inc. v. Fitzgerald, 332 Mass. 603, 127 N.E.2d 172 (1955) ("storage" in-
cluded; seller lost security interest); Nickerson v. Zeoli, 332 Mass. 738, 127 N.E.2d 779
(1955) ("reasonable expenses of repossession, removal, storage and sale"; seller lost security) ;
Clark v. A. & J. Transportation Co. Inc., 330 Mass. 327, 113 N.E.2d 228 (1953) ("reason-
able expenses for retaking, repairing, and selling such property, including a reasonable
attorney's fee"; seller lost security); Hurwitz v. Carpenzano, 329 Mass. 702, 110 N.E.2d
367 (1953) (contract silent; seller lost security interest); Mogul v. Boston Acceptance Co.
Inc., 328 Mass. 424, 104 N.E.2d 427 (1952) ("all expenses for retaking, repairing, and
selling such property"; seller lost security interest) ; Lehan v. North Main St. Garage, Inc.,
312 Mass. 547, 45 N.E.2d 945 (1942) (contract silent; seller lost security).
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If there is no duty to account to the buyer after resale, the seller retains
any profits made on the transaction. Apparently, most resales result in
the realization of little or no funds in excess of the amount owed and
the expenses of the retaking and resale.140 But again if such excess does
result, the seller gets all that he bargained for if he is permitted to keep
only the amount of the debt and the expenses of realizing on the secu-
rity. The buyer should receive any excess, particularly in light of the
fact that he remains liable for any deficiency.' 41
VI. SAFEGUARDS IN LITIGATION
One would expect lawsuits to follow realization upon the security
only when the amount of the deficiency is significant, or perhaps when
an example is to be made of a particularly recalcitrant buyer. However,
there was early recognition that the expense of litigation is quickly re-
duced in a nonadversary proceeding. By means of confessions of judg-
ment or power of attorney provisions in the contract, the holder is
empowered to obtain a judgment against the debtor without much cost
or difficulty. Since the debtor gets neither notice nor opportunity to be
heard in such a situation, these harsh practices received severe legisla-
tive treatment. Where existing law does not treat of the problem, several
retail instalment sales acts do.'4 '
Consideration must be given to the procedural aspect of the financing
agency's position in litigation. Traditionally the holder of a negotiable
instrument has procedural advantages in both pleading and proving his
cause of action. 4 Little attention has been directed toward these ad-
vantages in the regulatory legislation. This oversight has occurred
primarily through provisions in some acts directed toward protecting
the buyer in litigation with the finance company.'44 Holders in due course
have rather sacrosanct protection, particularly as to freedom from the
so-called personal defenses, such as fraud in the inducement, breach of
warranty, and failure of consideration.145 Guarded by this status, the
finance companies have usually avoided the assertion of such defenses
140 Cox, The Economics of Instalment Buying 280-82 (1948).
141 U.C.C. 9-504(2).
142 Colo. § 13-16-6(c); Conn. § 6699(a)(3); Ill. § 234; Ky. § 190.100(1)(c); Me.
§ 254VII; Md. § 118b; Minn. § 6a(2); NJ. § 6a(3); N.Y. §§ 302(14), 403(3); N.D.
§ 2 (14) ; Ore. § 14. (For full citation see notes 2 and 3 supra.) Wage assignments in
the contract are often similarly prohibited, e.g., cited sections of Illinois, Kentucky, North
Dakota and Oregon acts.
143 The advantage rests on presumptions of delivery and consideration and upon the
holder's prima fade position as a holder in due course. Negotiable Instruments Law
§§ 16, 24, 59. See U.C.C. 3-307, 3-408 (1957 ed.).
144 See statutes collected note 148 infra.
145 Negotiable Instruments Law § 57, U.C.C. 3-305 (1957 ed.). This traditional freedoni
from defenses has been traced in English law as far back as the fifteenth century. Holden;
History of Negotiable Instruments in English Law 63 (1955).
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by the buyer when sued on the note. 146 Thus the buyer has had to bear
the cost of litigating-with the seller and the risk of the seller's inso lency.
TS -followed even though the financing company had power to pursue
the seller whom it, as well as the buyer, had selected. In fact, the de-
termination by the finance company to deal with the seller, involves a
much more sophisticated and informed judgment than the similar deci-
sion by the consumer. By identifying the dealer with the finance com-
pany, a few courts have shifted these risks.147 The surprisingly scant
legislative response prohibits or limits the use of a negotiable instrument
in the retail instalment sale. 148 This presents little practical difficulty
'where the note and secured interest are jointly transferred. Perhaps be-
cause the separate negotiation of such instruments may be rare, care
has not been taken to safeguard such a transferee. 49
The problem of the buyer's defenses against his vendor does not end
with the consideration of the negotiable instruments law because financ-
ing companies have been able to insulate themselves through terms
waiving defenses against assignees of the contract. 150 Legislative action
146 E.g., Cotton v. John Deere Plow Co., 246 Ala. 36, 18 So. 2d 727 (1944); Commer-
cial Credit Co. v. M. McDonough Co., 238 Mass. 73, 130 N.E. 179 (1921); B.A.C. Corp.
v. Cirucci, 131 N.J.L. 93, 35 A.2d 36 (1944).
147 Close relationship of seller and finance company: Commercial Credit Co. v. Childs,
199 Ark. 1073, 137 S.W.2d 260 (1940) (finance company supplied forms with a printed
assignment, and the instruments were assigned immediately); Commercial Credit Corp.
v. Orange County Machine Works, 34 Cal. 2d 766, 214 P.2d 819 (1950) (facts similar to
Commercial Credit Co. v. Childs, supra, and evidence of telephone participation by finance
company); Mutual Finance Co. v. Martin, 63 So. 2d 649 (Fla. 1953) (finance company
used forms, and that company's office designated as place of payment); compare, Imple-
ment Credit Corp. v. Elsinger, 268 Wis. 143, 66 N.W.2d 657 (1954). Seller said to be
agent of finance company: Palmer v. Associates Discount Corp., 124 F.2d 225 (D.C. Cir.
1941) ; Associates Discount Corp. v. Goetzinger, 245 Iowa 326, 62 N.W.2d 191 (1954).
Holder is also the transferee of conditional sales contract: First & Lumbermen's Natl.
Bank v. Buchholz, 220 Minn. 97, 18 N.W.2d 771 (1945) (notice from executory nature
of contract) ; Unif. Cond. Sales Act § 1 (seller defined to include assignee). The Commer-
cial Credit Co. v. Childs case, supra, involved a suit to assert in rem rights under the
conditional sale distinct from the suit on the note and might be distinguished on that
basis. See also the exhaustive annotation, 44 A.L.R.2d 8 (1955) and the excellent Note,
33 N.C.L. Rev. 608 (1955).
148 In Maryland (§ 134) the note must refer to the instalment contract and is subjected
to defenses of the buyer. Other states forbid utilization of any negotiable instrument
which will cut off the buyer's defenses in the hands of a third party: N.Y. §§ 302(9),
403; N.D. § 2(8); Ore. § 9(1); Pa. § 615. On the other hand, Michigan (§ 492.114(f))
specifically safeguards the insulated position of the holder in due course. (For full cita-
tion see notes 2 and 3 supra.)
149 One court protected the buyer rather than the innocent financing agency, even
where the note was separated from and did not refer to the contract as required by the
regulatory act. Griffin v. Baltimore Federal Savings & Loan Assoc., 204 Md. 154, 102
A.2d 804 (1954) (confession of judgment provision in note).
150 A provision that the contract when assigned "shall be free from any defense, coun-
terciaim, or cross complaint" was held to preclude the defense of failure of consideration
even if the plaintiff was not a holder in due course in Commercial Credit Corp. v. Biagi,
11 Ill. App. 2d 80, 136 N.E.2d 580 (1956). On the other hand a similar provision was
denied effect in Quality Finance Co. v. Hurley, - Mass. -, 148 N.E.2d 385 (1958). For
a suggestion that the commercial importance of freedom of defenses has been exaggerated
see Gilmore and Axelrod, "Chattel Security," 57 Yale L.J. 517, 541 (1948), Under the
English Hire-Purchase system contracts, the buyer's contract is not with the retailer but
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ranges from complete prohibition of such contract clauses to the limited
protection afforded in the New York legislation.15' The latter protects
the assignee under the contract terms only where the assignee takes the
transfer in good faith and for value, and has no notice of the claim
within ten days after mailing a notice of the transfer to the buyer.'52
Claims of defective performance are thus available to the buyer for the
limited period, but the statute also protects the assignee from fictitious
defenses fabricated when the buyer discovers he is unable to pay the
debt. Where there are latent defects in the goods, the risk of suing the
seller is thrown upon the buyer, but considerations of the relative inno-
cence of both parties and the desirability of a free flow of this kind of
paper make the provision seem meritorious.
One objection to protecting the buyer in these cases is that it places
him in a better position than a cash buyer of the goods, since the fact
of payment would force the cash buyer to sue the seller and thus take
the risk of the seller's absconding or insolvency.5 3 This is true, but it
does not seem to answer the problem of balancing the interest of the
financing agency and the buyer where the buyer has not paid the seller
but has bought on credit. In fact, the buyer could reply that his position
regarding defenses is more comparable to a buyer whose seller extends
credit without the intervention of a finance agency. In that case the
buyer's defenses are obviously available in litigation with the seller.
When the financing agency is introduced into the transaction, the en-
tire question really involves an allocation of the risks of the seller's
moral and financial integrity to the buyer or the finance company. The
intensity of feeling upon this issue can be traced through the history of
the problem in the Uniform Commercial Code. The original drafts con-
tained strong provisions favoring the buyer, but these were gradually
tempered in the heat of controversy so that the present provisions leave
the question almost entirely to state law. 54 Here again the Code care-
fully leaves adequate ground for regulatory statutes.
155
with the finance company, and consequently there are many obstacles to the buyer's
attempt to fix the seller with express or implied warranty obligations. Donovan, "Retail
Instalment Sales-The Australian Experience," 33 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 666, 675-80, 683-84
(1958).
151 Prohibition: Mich. § 492.114(f); Miss. § 26(i); Pa. § 615. Limitation: N.Y.
§§ 302(9), 403(3) (a); NJD. § 2(8). (For full citation see notes 2 and 3 supra.)
152 N.Y. Pers. Prop. Law §§ 302(9), 403(3)(a). The form and content of the notice
is prescribed by the statute which calls for a specific disclosure of the effect of the notice.
153 Position of N.Y. Clearing House on U.C.C. 9-206(1) (1952 ed.), 1954 Report N.Y.
Law Rev. Comm. 1100, 1106-1108.
154 The development was from a complete preservation of the consumer's defenses to
a middle ground "fearfully and wonderfully made" insulating the finance company in
suits on the note but opening defenses if the finance company sought to repossess, attach,
or levy upon the goods sold. Sutherland, "Article 3-Logic, Experience and Negotiable
Paper," 1952 Wis. L. Rev. 230, 235-40. After the New York Law Revision Commission
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VII. CONSEQUENCES OF VIOLATION
Sanctions upon noncompliance can be categorized into three group-
ings: (1) criminal penalties, (2) civil remedies afforded the buyer, and
(3) revocation of required licenses. Of these the criminal sanction is
most widely found on the statute books. Usually a willful violation of
the statute constitutes a misdemeanor punishable by fine and occasionally
by imprisonment.156 An interesting feature of the New York legislation
covering goods other than motor vehicles, is the recognition of a power
to correct the violation and thus avoid the criminal penalty. Except
where there is a willful violation in connection with consolidations and
"add ons," the violator may correct the condition within ten days after
notice of the violation. 5 7 This avenue of escape from compliance with
the statute at the time of the sale may save the hard case in which there
has been noncompliance with the more formalistic requirements of the
act. Thus if the seller gave the buyer an unsigned copy of the contract,
the policy of the act would be fulfilled if his signature was added to the
contract upon demand. 58 Other cases, however, could involve the dis-
closure provisions of the acts; for example, the willful failure of the
seller to itemize the elements of the time price. Disclosing the finance
charge and insurance costs after the contract is made obviously prevents
the buyer from making any effective comparison of the cost of obtaining
the money through another competitive agency.'59 Since in the New
York legislation the same saving provision operates to defeat the various
civil remedies, this is a major "loophole" in the buyer's protection1 4
Civil relief varies considerably, and the violation may result in loss
of the security interest or of the debt, in whole or in part. The buyer
hearings, further alterations occurred so that subject to different rules by statute or de-
cision in the state, the finance company can acquire freedom from defenses by taking a
note or by a contractual waiver. U.C.C. 9-206 (1957 ed.).
.. 155 Where there is no statute establishing a different rule for buyers of consumer goods,
problems may arise as to (1) cases subsequent to the enactment of the Code setting forth
results similar to those reached in the cases cited supra note 147 and (2) the result under
the Code where the case law is not limited to consumer goods as in Commercial Credit
Corp. v. Orange County Machine Works, 34 Cal. 2d 766, 214 P.2d 819 (1950).
. 156 Colo. § 13-6-9; Conn. Gen. Stat. § 2868(d) (1949); Fla. § 520.12; Il. § 243; Ind.
§ 58-929; Iowa § 322.14; Kan. § 11(a); Ky. § 190.090; Me. § 258; Md. § 137; Mass.
§ 13G; Mich. § 492.137; Minn. § 10; Miss. § 32(a); Neb. § 60-618; N.J. § 9; N.Y.§§ 307, 414; N.D. § 7; Ohio § 1317.99; Ore. § 27(1); Pa. § 637; S.). § 13; Wis. § 8.
(For full citations see notes 2 and 3 supra.)
. 157 N.Y. § 414; NJ). § 7; Ore. § 27. A similar provision in the N.Y. Motor Vehicle
Act was modified in 1958 to permit the avoidance of the civil penalty only. (For full
citations see notes 2 and 3 supra.)
158 This type of power to correct would partially reverse the result in Stride v. Mar-
tin, 184 Md. 446, 41 A.2d 489 (1945) ; but the contract there contained blanks in addition
to being unsigned.
159 This ability to compare is the primary reason for disclosure, see text supra at
note 29.
,: 160 N.Y. Pers. Prop. Law §§ 307(3), 414(3).
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may be permitted to recover the entire finance charge for all or some
violations."6 In some cases he is permitted to recover all the payments
previously made. 162 Under the Uniform Commercial Code, noncom-
pliance with the security realization provisions may entitle the debtor ta
recover the finance charge and ten per cent of the principal balance. 65
Prior to the enactment of the Code in Massachusetts, a conditional
seller could lose his security interest for failure to insert mandatory con-
tract provisions.'64 Idaho merely makes a noncomplying contract non-
recordable. 65 Of these the Code seems to provide the most effective
means of eliminating violations. One might voluntarily assume the risk
of losing his profits in the finance charge, but the added loss of part of
the principal amount increases the risk and seems to be a more effective
deterrent. To permit the buyer to recover all of the payments and per-
haps retain the goods seems unduly harsh.'66 The Massachusetts ap-
proach usually benefits the buyer only indirectly by avoiding the seller's
security interest. Most often the beneficiary of the sanction is a third
party who is contesting with the finance company concerning the in rem
rights to the goods.' 67 The recordability sanction in the Iowa statute may
be desirable since it, in effect, polices the contract terms in each transac-
tion. But here recording may be deliberately avoided by the seller or
finance company.
The problem of imposing the penalty whether it be civil or criminal,
upon the financing agency when the seller is the one guilty of violating
161 Colo. § 13-16-9; Conn. § 6703; Fla. § 520.12 (contract formalities and finance
charge limitation); Ill. §§ 240, 243 (or 10% of cash price if no finance charge is speci-
fied); Ind. § 58-908 (contract enforceable only to extent of the principal balance); Kan.
§ 11(b); Ky. § 190.990; Me. § 258; Md. § 136; Mich. § 492.131d; Miss. § 32(b); NJ.
§ 8; N.Y. §§ 307(2), 414(2); N.D. § 7; Ore. § 27(2); Pa. § 631; S.D. § 13; Utah
§ 15-1 to -2a(5); Va. § 46-532; Wis. § 6d. (For full citations see notes 2 and 3 supra.)
Some of the acts phrase this in terms of a bar to the recovery of the finance charge by
the violator, rather than in terms of giving the buyer a cause of action.
162 Explicit provisions are made for this result in Cal. § 2982e; Nev. § 97.060; Minn.
§ 10 (wilful violation); and Utah § 15-1 to -2a (conditioned on return of property sold).
(For full citation see notes 2 and 3 supra.)
163 U.C.C. 9-507(1) (1957 ed.).
164 Mass. Ann. Laws c. 255, § 13 A will be repealed by Mass. Acts 1957, c. 765, § 2,
effective October 1, 1958. The application of the proceeds of the sale will then be gov-
erned by U.C.C. 9-504(1) (1957 ed.), and the penalty will be that provided by U.C.C.
9-507, loss of the finance charge and 10% of the principal balance.
165 Idaho Code Ann. § 64-807 (Supp. 1957).
166 Carter v. Seaboard Finance Co., 33 Cal. 2d 564, 203 P.2d 758 (1949) (trucks re-
turned, nondisclosure entitled plaintiff to refund); Estrada v. Alvarez, 38 Cal. 2d 386,
240 P.2d 278 (1952) (car repossessed, inadequate disclosure, buyer entitled to refund);
Williams v. Caruso Enterprises Inc., 140 Cal. App. 2d Supp. 973, 295 P.2d 592 (1956)
(buyer entitled to refund only if vehicle repossessed or he offers to restore). See Note,
2 Stan. L. Rev. 362 (1950), arguing for no duty of restoration upon a buyer seeking a
full refund. Compare Stride v. Martin, 184 Md. 446, 41 A.2d 489 (1945) (unsigned copy
of contract and blanks, seller had "repossessed") and Roxy Auto Co. v. Moore, 180
Pa. Super. 603, 122 A.2d 87 (1956) (otherwise valid judgment by confession held void
by reason of failure to comply with disclosure requirements).
167 The buyer was a party in but two of the eight cases collected supra note 139.
Lepore v. Atlantic Corp., - Mass. -, 148 N.E.2d 279 (1958); Nickerson v. Zeoli, 332 Mass.
738, 127 N.E.2d 779 (1955).
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the regulatory requirements is usually resolved in favor of the holder.
This is accomplished by an authorization for an acknowledgment clause
in the contract or a provision that the penalty is not to be imposed upon
an innocent financing agency.16s
If the test of the penalty's worth is its effect as a deterrent, licensing,
the last of the controls, is the most desirable. Many of the more re-
cent statutes create a scheme of licensing of sales finance companies, and
violation of the regulatory legislation is a basis of revocation of the
license.'69 Inquiry and investigative powers should of course be an ad-
junct of the licensing power. 70 A few of the statutes create licensing
controls over the seller as well as the finance company.' 7' Such controls
of the seller operate upon the person dealing with the buyer and for this
reason enhance the chance of compliance with the regulatory features
of the statutes. On the other hand, it seems hardly probable that legis-
latures could be expected to require the licensing of sellers of all the
classes of goods or services sold on an instalment basis. Where present
legislation requires licensing of the dealer, it is aimed only at the seller
of motor vehicles.' Such a singling out of one group of consumer sales
raises the problem of the coverage of the various statutes. This subject
has been reserved until last because it can best be treated after a survey
of the abuses perceived and the remedies provided by the various
legislatures.
168 The acknowledgment operates to protect the assignee against the seller's violation
of the requirement of the delivery of a copy of the contract and the prohibition on
blanks, note 42 supra. The innocent assignee is saved from the criminal penalty because
of a requirement of "willfulness," see statutes note 156 supra. In the statutes explicitly
authorizing civil recovery of all payments made, the holder is only responsible for his own
violation. Where the statute provides for the recovery of the finance charge, there is
usually a similar provision or a requirement that the assignee is liable only if he had
knowledge of or ratified the violation. But see, Illinois, Indiana, Maryland, Michigan,
and Pennsylvania, supra note 161. In Mississippi the protection is extended only to pur-
chases in good faith for value "by any bank, trust company, private bank, industrial
bank or investment company authorized to do business in this state . . ." Miss. Laws
1958, H.B. No. 39, § 32(c); 1 CCH Cond. Sale Chat. Mortg. Rep. 8477, § 32(c).
169 Colo. § 13-6-2-3; Fla. § 520.03; Ind. § 58-915; Iowa § 322.3(2) (dealers only);
Kan. § 3; Me. § 250; Mich. § 492.103; Minn. § 3; Miss. § 15; N.J. § 2; N.Y. Banking
Law § liB; Pa. § 604; S.D. § 7; Wis. § 2. (For full citations see notes 2 and 3 supra.)
Several of these include within the definition of sales finance company a dealer who
himself finances the purchase of his buyer, e.g., Florida and Minnesota.
170 Colo. § 13-16-5; Fla. § 520.05-.06; Ind. § 58-926; Iowa added § 8; Kan. §§ 5, 6;
Me. § 253; Mich. § 492.110; Minn. § 5; Miss. §§ 23, 24, 25; N.J. §§ 4, 5; N.Y. Banking
Law § liB; Pa. § 611; S.D. § 12; Wis. § 2. (For full citations see notes 2 and 3 supra.)
i1 Iowa § 322.3(2); Ky. Rev. Stat. § 190.010-.080 (Supp. 1957); Me. § 2501; Mich.§ 492.103; Pa. § 604 (also licenses, collectors and repossessors); Wis. § 2. (For full
citations see notes 2 and 3 supra.) A report of buyers' complaints in Wisconsin for the
period January 1, 1936 to November 10, 1939 buttresses the need for dealer control. Of
the 1043 complaints received, 59% were settled without monetary adjustment; 38% re-
sulted in money adjustments in favor of the buyers averaging $61.00; and 30% were not
settled satisfactorily. Of the cases involving money adjustment, three-fourths were at-
tributed to dealer "ethics" and but one-fourth to finance company practices. Plummer
& Young, Sales Finance Companies and Their Credit Practices 242 (1940).
172 Iowa § 322.2(9); Ky. § 190.09(2); Me. § 249; Mich. § 492.102(1); Pa. § 603;




The defined scope of the acts varies considerably; the limits are ex-
pressed in terms of the type or value of the goods, the kinds of buyers
involved, and the presence or absence of a security device in the sale.
Motor vehicle sales are the principal target, and many of the statutes
extend controls to this area alone. 73 This appears to be caused by the
huge volume and the frequency of abuses in the automobile trans-
action.17 4
The concentration of legislative effort upon the peculiar problems of a
particular group of sellers and financing agencies probably accounts for
the fact that most of the statutory regulation of the finance charges is
found in statutes limited to motor vehicle sales. 5  The difficulty of
fairly formulating a maximum finance charge schedule to cover a variety
of goods has been noted previously. Some of the abuses, such as the
use of "add on" provisions, have infrequent application in the motor
vehicle area.' 76 Other practices have little application beyond this motor
vehicle area; for example, the disclosure of liability insurance coverage.
Finally, the most effective enforcement device, licensing, is much more
manageable when confined to a single industry. So limited licensing of
the dealers becomes practical even where such sellers do not act as their
own sales financing agency. All of the statutes which so control the
dealer are limited to motor vehicle sales.
77
Statutory criteria establishing the classification of ccmotor vehicles"
differ. Wisconsin simply includes any vehicle required to be regis-
tered . 7  New York's classification is in terms of propulsion by other
than muscular power. 9 Kentucky excludes certain construction equip.
ment, agricultural implements, and vehicles sold for business and com-
173 Cal. § 2981; Colo. § 13-16-1(2); Fla. § 520.02; Iowa § 322.2(8); Ky. § 190.090(2);
Me. § 249; Mich. § 492.102(1); Minn. § lb(1); Miss. § 6; Nev. § 97.010; N.Y. § 301(1)
(separate act covers other goods); N.D. § 1(3); Ore. § 1(9); Pa. § 603; S.D. § 1(b);
Wis. § 1(e). (For full citations see notes 2 and 3 supra.)
174 Motor vehicle paper represented 15 billion of the 23 billion dollars of outstanding
consumer paper in 1957. Fed. Reserve Bull. 1074 (Sept. 1957). In 1955 only 38% of the
new car buyers purchased entirely by cash (including trade-ins). U.S. Dept. of Com-
merce, Statistical Abstract of the U.S. (1957). Abuses in the automobile field were em-
phasized in Nugent and Henderson, "Installment Selling and the Consumer," 173 Annals 93,
96-99 (1934). See also Illinois Legislative Council Bulletin No. 2-590, pp. 2-3 (March 1956).
175 Of the twenty-one states regulating rates, note 54 supra, fourteen are limited to
motor vehicle transactions: California, Florida, Iowa, Kentucky, Maine, Michigan, Minne-
sota, Mississippi, Nevada, North Dakota, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Dakota and Wis-
consin. Two of the remaining states, Connecticut and Maryland, have broader coverage
but limit their rate regulation to motor vehicles. New York, of course, has separate acts
regulating motor vehicles and other goods, note 18 supra.
176 Note, 101 U. Pa. L. Rev. 530, 544 (1953). One state limits "add ons" only in cases
dealing with household goods and personal effects. Mass. Ann. Laws c. 255, § 13B (Supp.
1956).
177 Note 172 supra.
178 Wis. Stat. Ann. § 218.01(1)(k) (Supp. 1957).
179 N.Y. Pers. Prop. Law § 301(1).
1958]
CORNELL LAW QUARTERLY
mercial use.180 The non-application of the controls to purely business
transactions is found in other statutes either in the definition of motor
vehicles or in an exclusionary provision and appears to be based upon
consideration of the kind of buyers who need protection.' 8 It is easy
to become concerned about the unwary and eager consumer who deals
directly with the professional seller and indirectly with the skilled financ-
ing agency. The intensity of concern diminishes when the adversaries
are two professionals: the commercial buyer and seller or financing firm.
Furthermore, extending the prohibitions of the regulatory acts to sales
between businessmen may impede normal commercial practices, for
example, the employment of "balloon notes."'
82
Thus the buyer of a fleet of automobiles is to be distinguished in the
protecting statute from the buyer of the family car. This kind of ap-
proach also accounts for the dollar limitations in many of the acts. These
vary from $2,000 to $7,500.183 Where this is the only tool employed to
exclude wholly business transactions, the amount should be large enough
to bring controls to the high dollar automobile purchasers. Safeguards
should extend to the consumer purchaser of the limousine as well as to
the buyer of the low price car. The Uniform Commercial Code meets
the drafting problem of distinguishing buyers needing protection from
those who do not. Section 9-109 defines consumer goods as those "used
or bought for use primarily for personal, family or household purposes."
Instalment sales legislation can easily be built upon this kind of defini-
tion, and as precedents arise under the Code they can be used in marking
out the meaning of the regulatory acts.
Only the New York, Ohio and Kansas acts govern unsecured transac-
tions. New York has special provisions governing formalities, disclosure,
and rate regulation of what are called "retail instalment credit agree-
ments" in various categories of unsecured sales.' 84 Ohio and Kansas
180 Ky. Rev. Stat. § 190.090(3) and (4) (Supp. 1957).
181 The earlier drafts of the Uniform Commercial Code contained disclosure provisions
with loss of the finance charge or the security interest as penalties. These operated only
to protect consumers, i.e., purchasers of goods for their personal, family or household use.
U.C.C. §§ 9-101, 9-205 (1950 ed.). Reasons for the provisions are set out in Gilmore, "The
Secured Transactions Article of the Commercial Code," 16 Law & Contemp. Prob. 27,
37 (1951). Criticism of such provisions in a uniform act are set forth in Ireton, "The
Proposed Commercial Code: A New Deal in Chattel Security," 43 III. L. Rev. 794, 804
(1949) ; Kripke, "The 'Secured Transactions' Provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code,"
35 Va. L. Rev. 577, 612-15 (1949).
182 Saulnier & Jacoby, Financing Equipment for Commercial and Industrial Enterprises
62 (1944).
183 Fla. § 520.02(a) ($7500); Ind. § 58-901(a) ($5000); Ky. § 190.090(4) ($5000);
Md. § 139a ($2000); Miss. § 2 ($7500); N.J. § la ($3000); Ohio § 1317.06(A)(2) (Act
applies only where finance charge exceeds $15.00 under regulated rate); Utah
§ 15-1-2a(B)(7) ($7500). (For full citations see notes 2 and 3 supra.)
184 N.Y. Pers. Prop. Law § 413. These are agreements to pay in instalments any in-
debtedness that may be incurred from time to time to a retail seller for goods, services,
or merchandise certificates. N.Y. Pers. Prop. Law § 401(8). Also regulated are the
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merely include such contracts within the coverage of the provision gov-
erning secured sales. 85 The remainder of the statutes limit their scope
to secured transactions only. Some label their provisions in terms of
conditional sales contracts exclusively."8 Judicial penetration into the
policy of the acts, especially in the presence of a broad statutory defini-
tion of conditional sale, should lead to the inclusion of other devices such
as the chattel mortgage. 87 Otherwise, we obtain the strange result that
the social protections afforded the consumer can be avoided by the seller
merely by the use of a different legal form in the transaction.
IX. CONCLUSION
Two polar evils can result from the adoption of retail instalment sales
legislation. One is the oppression of the business of instalment selling.
There is little evidence that this has been the case where controls have
been in effect for many years. The other evil is that the practical effect
of the legislation will be thwarted by the unscrupulous, whom we must
recognize as gifted in the art of law evasion.
Both of these undesirable results will flow from statutes which unduly
specify the required contract provisions. The same can be said of acts
with broad terms of coverage, unaccompanied by careful concern with
the special legitimate problems of the various merchandising groups.
The inflexibility of statutory contract terms and undifferentiated cover-
age provisions will strangle the ethical and tempt the criminal.
On the other hand, if each legislature focuses upon the actual abuses
within its jurisdiction in the marketing of given items to particular
buyers, workable controls can be fashioned. Lodging licensing, investiga-
tive, and rate making power in an administrative agency enhances both
enforcement and flexibility. Viewing retail instalment sales legislation
as a problem for individual treatment by each of the states in light of the
unique conditions in each state, uniform legislation should be presently
avoided. Similarly, a desire for statutory symmetry with the small loan
,controls should not force the sales finance business into the mold of the
small loan industry. Additional experience may someday furnish a basis
for uniformity among the states, but that day has not yet arrived.
"retail instalment obligations" which generally are present unsecured sales with payments
made in instalments. The latter kind of agreement may be made applicable to future pur-
chases in an amount not exceeding $175 for each purchase. N.Y. Pers. Prop. Law §§ 401(7)
and 402(7).
185 Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 1317.01 (Page 1953).
188 Cal. § 2981; Idaho § 64-806; Mass. § 13F; Nev. § 97.010(3); Utah § 15-1 to -2a.
(For full citation see notes 2 and 3 supra.)
18T Carter v. Seaboard Finance Co., 33 Cal.2d 564, 203 P.2d 758 (1949) (chattel
mortgage held within regulatory act governing "conditional sales"); see also Waterbor v.
Livingood, 179 Pa. Super. 610, 117 A.2d 790 (1955) ("U Drive It" contract providing for
lease for indefinite term and for forced sale to lessee with application of rental payments
in the event of breach of the lease was held to be outside regulatory act).
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